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Privacy by design is about making privacy part of the conception and development of 
new data collection tools. But how should we interpret “privacy by design” as a legal mandate? 
As it transitions from an academic buzzword into binding law, privacy by design will, for the 
first time, impose real responsibilities on real people to do specific things at specific times. And 
yet, there remains significant disagreement about what privacy by design actually means in 
practice: we have yet to define its who, what, when, why, and how. Privacy by design is 
unmoored and unclear. This Article fills that void. More specifically, this Article offers a new 
paradigm, based on the law of products liability for design defects, for thinking about privacy 
by design as a law. This Article shows how privacy by design and products liability arose in 
similar socioeconomic contexts to answer similar questions and to achieve similar goals. It 
makes sense, then, to look to products liability to explain the proactive obligations of 
technology companies to design technology products with privacy and the needs of consumers in 
mind.  
INTRODUCTION  
The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which 
took effect on May 25, 2018, calls for privacy “by design and by default.”1So-called 
“privacy by design” has also been endorsed by the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC)2 and the Office of the Attorney General of California.3 Privacy by design is 
now the law. But beyond a general understanding that it refers to making privacy 
part of the design process for new technologies, what privacy by design means in 
practice is far from clear.4 That uncertainty is fatal to its transition from an academic 
buzzword to a legal mandate: If neither regulators nor the regulated know what 
 
1.     See Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) [hereinafter 
Regulation 2016/679]. 
2. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 22 (2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-
rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y575-Q9CE] 
[hereinafter FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY]. 
3. CAL.  DEP’T  OF  JUSTICE,  OFFICE  OF  THE  ATT’Y  GEN.,  PRIVACY  ON  THE  GO: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE MOBILE ECOSYSTEM 1, 4 (2013), https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/
files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/privacy_on_the_go.pdf  [https://perma.cc/2TFV-DDK7] (“Our 
recommendations, which in many places offer greater protection than afforded by existing law, are 
intended to encourage all players in the mobile marketplace to consider privacy implications at the outset 
of the design process.”) (emphasis added). 
4. The word “design” can mean many different things, from intentions (something is done “by 
design”) to aesthetics (a room can be designed to be visually appealing). But, for the purposes of this 
Article, I follow the broad definition outlined by Woodrow Hartzog in his book, Privacy’s Blueprint, 
which defines design as the “processes that create consumer technologies and the results of their 
creative processes instantiated in hardware and software.” WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S 
BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 11 (2018).  
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privacy by design means, they can neither enforce it nor comply with it. This Article 
fills this void, situating privacy by design in the sociological and legal literatures and 
ultimately providing a model for what a privacy by design statute should look like 
in practice. 
Any effective privacy by design statute has to answer five questions—namely, 
the who, what, when, why, and how of design law. Upon whom are we imposing the 
responsibility for privacy by design? Most definitions place the burden on data 
collectors, processers, and technology companies.5 But this approach presumes a 
particular, value-laden definition of “design” that sees it as entirely the company’s 
responsibility.6 Sociologists of technology, many of whom have shown how the 
design process is far more complex, would challenge that presumption.7  
When do privacy by design’s obligations apply? The obvious answer—namely, 
during “design”—is circular and implies that we can identify design’s clear 
beginning and endpoint. But social scientists who study technology argue that 
design is an ongoing, iterative social process that involves engineers and corporate 
actors, users, exogenous social forces, and even the state. It also continues long after 
widget version 1.0 is available for sale.8 
What does privacy by design look like in practice? Academics and regulators have 
offered a variety of visions for privacy by design, but none offer clear practical 
guidance to industry or the courts. To some, a privacy by design law would list a set 
of privacy principles;9 to others, it would require coding those principles into 
technology’s architecture.10 Yet for others, it would mandate that technology 
embody certain values.11 This uncertainty is not just fertile grounds for scholars. 
Inside technology companies, the effects are real, contributing to frustration, 
 
5. See, e.g., Regulation 2016/679, supra note 1, art. 25, at 48, which states that “the controller 
shall, . . . implement appropriate technical and organisational measures . . . .” “Controller” is defined as 
“the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others, 
determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data,” that is, the company behind a 
technology product or website. Id. art. 4, para. 7, at 34. 
6. See infra Part I.A. 
7. See THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS (Wiebe E. Bijker et. al eds., 
2012). 
8. For a good summary of this literature, please see id. 
9. See ANN CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN: THE SEVEN FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES 
(2009), https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/Privacy%20by%20Design%20-%207%20 
Foundational%20Principles.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7FH-BPED]. 
10. See, e.g., Seda Gurses, Carmela Troncoso & Claudia Diaz, Engineering Privacy by Design, in 
COMPUTERS, PRIVACY & DATA PROTECTION 1, 3 (2011) (arguing that privacy engineering has the 
potential to turn privacy by design goals into reality); see also Ira S. Rubinstein & Nathaniel Good, Privacy 
by Design: A Counterfactual Analysis of Google and Facebook Privacy Incidents, 28 BERKELEY  
TECH. L.J. 1333, 1341–42 (2013) (arguing that privacy by design requires translating privacy principles 
into code, both in the back-end infrastructure of data collection and front-end user interfaces). 
11. See, e.g., HARTZOG, supra note 4 (laying out a series of guidelines for compliance with privacy 
by design, including a series of pro-consumer social values); HELEN NISSENBAUM & MARY 
FLANAGAN, VALUES AT PLAY IN DIGITAL GAMES (2014) (discussing the way in which game designers 
integrate values into their products). 
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inefficiencies, and confusion.12 Plus, the breadth of possible interpretations of 
privacy by design leaves American and European courts, the FTC, and European 
data protection authorities completely unbounded when they inevitably confront 
the first design law questions.  
Why are we imposing privacy by design mandates? Design’s significant, yet invisible, 
capacity to manipulate those who exist inside its ecosystem requires us to consider 
the values we want design to promote.13 There are a number of values that could 
be at the center of privacy by design, ranging from enhancing user control to 
protecting justice, fairness, and equality.14 A better understanding of the normative 
goals of privacy by design can help companies and regulators determine if corporate 
actions comply with both the letter and spirit of a privacy by design statute.  
How can users pursue their right to privacy by design? Vindicating privacy rights is 
an ongoing problem in the United States,15 where federal courts have gone out of 
 
12. Several surveys have shown that organizations remain confused about GDPR compliance, 
generally. See, e.g., Commvault, Global Survey Shows That 89% of Organisations Are Still Confused by 
GDPR, BUS. COMPUTING WORLD (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.businesscomputingworld.co.uk/
news-post/global-survey-shows-that-89-of-organisations-are-still-confused-by-gdpr/ [http:// 
web.archive.org/web/20180712205117/https://www.businesscomputingworld.co.uk/news-
post/global-survey-shows-that-89-of-organisations-are-still-confused-by-gdpr/]; Survey Finds 
That GDPR Is Still Confusing Global Organizations; And Preparations Are Lacking, CONTINUITY 
CENT. (Sept. 25, 2017), http://www.continuitycentral.com/index.php/news/erm-news/2318-survey-
finds-that-gdpr-is-still-confusing-global-organizations-and-preparations-are-lacking [https:// 
perma.cc/74FU-5KTW] (37% of companies report not knowing if they need to comply with the 
GDPR).  
13. See, e.g., HENRI LEFEVBRE, THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE 224 (Donald Nicholson-Smith 
trans., 1991) (1984) (the nature of a space is determine by what designers want to happen to not to 
happen in it);  LUCY A. SUCHMAN, HUMAN-MACHINE RECONFIGURATIONS 186–92, 257–84 (2d ed. 
2007) (arguing that users interact with technologies in ways defined by design); Steve Woolgar, 
Configuring the User: The Case of Usability Trials, in A SOCIOLOGY OF MONSTERS: ESSAYS ON POWER, 
TECHNOLOGY, AND DOMINATION 59, 67–69 ( John Law ed., 1991) (users are limited in what they can 
do with a product given its design); Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace As/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210, 
225–27 (2007) (the design of online built environments limit user behavior just like the design of 
physical environments).  
14. Equality can be designed in. See, e.g., Rena Bivens & Oliver L. Haimson, Baking Gender Into 
Social Media Design: How Platforms Shape Categories for Users and Advertisers, SOCIAL MEDIA  
+ SOCIETY, Oct. 12, 2016, at 3–7  (gender binaries are baked into the design of social media platforms); 
Rena Bivens, The Gender Binary Will Not Be Deprogrammed: Ten Years of Coding Gender on Facebook, 
19 NEW MEDIA & SOCIETY 880, 880–81 (2017) (even with changes and developments, gender remains 
designed into social media platforms). 
15. See Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data Breach 
Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 750–56 (2018) (showing how courts conceive of data breach harms 
exceedingly narrowly and deny standing to breach victims). In Europe, victims of privacy and data 
harms have the benefit of national data protection authorities (DPAs). DPAs are regulatory agencies 
that can enforce the data protection rights of EU citizens. They were created by the EU Privacy 
Directive in 1995 as part of a multilayered approach to privacy enforcement in the European 
community. See Directive 95/46 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and On the Free 
Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281). 
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their way to put up barriers to privacy plaintiffs.16 Not knowing what privacy’s 
design law requires of companies erects two more hurdles: it removes a benchmark 
by which consumers and their lawyers can judge compliance and makes it difficult 
to know how to litigate a potential case. 
Without answers to these who, what, when, how, and why questions, design 
law is at risk. The law would be open to wildly different interpretations from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, allowing companies to escape liability by fleeing to 
friendly territories.17 Vague statutes also give corporate bureaucrats the chance the 
define the law in ways that benefit their bottom line rather than consumers, putting 
a thumb on the scale by the time the first court has its say.18   
Such interpretive problems are nothing new. The limitations of language and 
the legislative drafting process often result in statutes that leave their meaning and 
details to those interpreting them.19 In those cases, courts and regulators look to 
doctrinal guides and analogies to make sense of vague terms.20 Corporations, 
investors, and other stakeholders need some manner of predictability as they plan 
for a future within the confines of new legal requirements, like privacy’s law  
of design.21  
 
16. See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545, 1550 (2016) (denying standing to data 
breach victims because of an inability to demonstrate “concrete and particularized” harm resulting from 
the breach). 
17. See Ian Burrell, Billy Hawkes: The Irishman with a Billion People’s Privacy to Protect, 
INDEPENDENT (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and tech/news/
billy-hawkes-the-irishman-witha-billion-people-s-privacy-to-protect-9115818.html [https://perma.cc/ 
D6TS-K57X]; Leo Mirani, How a Bureaucrat in a Struggling Country at the Edge of Europe Found Himself 
Safeguarding the World’s Data, QUARTZ ( Jan. 7, 2014), http://qz.com/162791/how-a-bureaucrat-in-
a-struggling-country-at-the-edge-of-europe-foundhimself-safeguarding-the-worlds-data/ [https:// 
perma.cc/LDR6-SVAY]. 
18. LAUREN B. EDELMAN, WORKING LAW: COURTS, CORPORATIONS, AND SYMBOLIC CIVIL 
RIGHTS (2016) (discussing how the internal systems created by regulated companies are often taken as 
evidence of compliance with the law even when companies are actively resisting the goals of the law). 
19. See e.g., Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A 
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 594–96 (2002) (documenting “deliberate ambiguity” 
in statutes); Adam C. Pritchard & Joseph A. Grundfest, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The 
Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 640 (2002); see also 
FREDERICK REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 43–53 
(1975) (discussing how the inherent limitations of language create ambiguity in statutes).   
20. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, The Banality of Legal Reasoning, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 517 
(1998); Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics and the Rational Force of Legal 
Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923, 937 (1996); Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of Theory, 29 
ARIZ. ST. L. J. 353 (1997); James R. Murray, The Role of Analogy in Legal Reasoning, 29 UCLA  
L. REV. 833 (1982); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987); Cass R. Sunstein, 
On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993). 
21. See, e.g., Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2  
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 279–80 (1986) (showing that uncertainty in the law creates negative 
externalities); Kevin V. Tu, Regulating the New Cashless World, 65 ALA. L. REV. 77, 109–13 
(2013) (regulatory and legal uncertainty deters investment and development of new business models); 
see also JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 317–18 (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“What farmer 
or manufacturer will lay himself out for the encouragement given to any particular cultivation or 
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This Article fills this gap by proposing that a privacy by design statute should 
incorporate the principles of products liability for design defects. This makes sense 
because design is an exercise of power. Its strength comes from its breadth and its 
invisibility (we often do not realize the myriad ways in which design affects our 
lives).22 Good design can make our lives better, easier, or safer; bad design can cause 
insecurity, pain, and inequality. As Don Norman wrote in The Design of Everyday 
Things, “[w]ell-designed objects are easy to interpret and understand . . . . Poorly 
designed objects can be difficult and frustrating to use. They provide no clues—or 
sometimes false clues. They trap the user.”23 Predatory corporations have exercised 
this power of design for years. When manufacturers built products with designed-
in dangers that consumers were unable to see, thus causing harm, the common law 
developed the law of products liability to help victims obtain justice. This area of 
the law, a tort-based regime that holds producers liable for the harm caused by 
products they put on the market, addressed the same questions raised by privacy by 
design, from who bears the responsibility of design to what those responsible 
should have done to the values those obligations were meant to serve. And judges 
imposed liability on corporate actors despite fuzzy definitions of design, in part 
because of the social values—namely, fairness, justice, and the alleviation of power 
imbalances—in the common law. Because designing for data collection creates 
similar power imbalances and has the capacity to take advantage of users, privacy’s 
law of design should be defined by analogy to products liability for design defects.24 
Several scholars have already proposed using strict or products liability to 
address some privacy and data breach harms.25 My argument is different. I am not 
 
establishment, when he can have no assurance that his preparatory labors and advances will not render 
him a victim to an inconstant government?”).  
22. See HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 21–55; see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime 
Control, 111 YALE L. J. 1039, 1043 (2002) (discussing how architecture and design can “increase the 
cost of perpetrating crime, facilitate law enforcement, promote development of social norms of law-
abiding and law-reinforcing behavior, and shape tastes against crime” without anyone knowing). 
23. DONALD A. NORMAN, THE DESIGN OF EVERYDAY THINGS 2 (1988); see also HENRI 
LEFEBVRE, THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE 224 (Donald Nicholson-Smith trans., 1991) (1984). For a 
summary of how the design of both offline and online built environments can manipulate the behavior 
of those within those environments, see, e.g., HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 27–51; Julie E. Cohen, 
Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210 (2007); Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Notice, and 
Design, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 74, 99–107 (2018) (collecting and discussing examples from fine art, 
architecture, interior design, and urban design and comparing them to how companies design privacy 
notices). 
24. See infra Part II.A. 
25. Various scholars have called for at least some version of a strict liability agenda to combat 
data privacy harms. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and 
Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 296 (2007) (arguing for imposing 
strict liability on those who securely store and process our data); James Grimmelmann, Privacy as 
Product Safety, 19 WIDENER L. J. 793, 827 (2010) (arguing for applying some strict liability principles to 
data privacy, though cautioning against “import[ing] the full details of [products liability] doctrines, 
warts and all, into privacy law”); Benjamin R. Sachs, Consumerism and Information Privacy: How Upton 
Sinclair Can Again Save Us from Ourselves, 95 VA. L. REV. 205, 231 (2009) (noting the inability of users 
to protect themselves). 
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suggesting a new products liability tort for privacy-invasive design through which 
individuals could sue technology companies and data collectors. Rather, privacy by 
design is now a bare-bones statute that requires detail. Products liability has 
untapped potential as a set of norms that can help define what that statute should 
look like in practice. Several tort doctrines that have come to set the standard for 
corporate behavior are helpful: risk-utility balancing, reasonable alternative design 
(RAD), foreseeable unintended uses, and the duty to warn can all help describe what 
a privacy by design statute should require.26 
This Article answers the who, what, when, why, and how of privacy by design 
as a legal mandate, providing a doctrinal and practical approach to what I am calling 
privacy’s law of design. Part I lays out the problem: questions remain unanswered. 
This Part challenges the assumptions embedded in some of the formulations of 
privacy by design to date, particularly with respect to the meaning of design and the 
role of companies, users, and others in that process, and highlights the uncertainty 
remaining for companies and regulators to resolve. Part II proposes a new analogy: 
products liability for defectively designed products. This analogy makes sense 
because both design laws emerged in similar contexts and both are meant to address 
the same underlying problem—namely, products that, outside of our view and 
knowledge capacity, pose dangers that we cannot avoid. This Part applies products 
liability principles to privacy by design and develops a concise, yet detailed vision of 
what a privacy by design statute should look like. This Part concludes by discussing 
the advantages to the approach and responding to objections. The Article concludes 
with a short summary and avenues for future research. 
I. PRIVACY BY DESIGN AS LAW 
The various definitions of privacy by design in the academic literature agree 
only that (1) design is a corporate responsibility; (2) corporations have to take 
technological and structural steps to comply; and (3) they have to do so ex ante, or 
before something goes wrong.27 But details remain hazy: calls for “privacy by 
design”28 or “data protection by design and by default”29 leave the who, what, when, 
why, and how of design law unclear. 
Sociologists and science and technology scholars tell us that design is complex, 
nuanced, and multifaceted.30 Design extends beyond meetings, coding, or product 
 
26. See infra Part II.C. 
27. See infra Parts I.A.1, I.B.1. 
28. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 2. 
29. See Regulation 2016/679, supra note 1, art. 25, at 48. 
30. Science and technology studies (STS) and sociologists of technology argue that technology 
occupies space in society in ways that affect individuals and in ways that individuals affect technology. 
In this field, technology products are cultural artifacts; our iPhones are not just hand-held computers 
and telephones, but also exercises of social power and reflections of social needs. See, e.g., BRUNO 
LATOUR, REASSEMBLING THE SOCIAL: AN INTRODUCTION TO ACTOR-NETWORK THEORY 9–16 
(2005); SERGIO SISMONDO, AN INTRODUCTION TO SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES (2d ed. 
2010); THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS, supra note 7. 
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release dates to users and other social groups operating outside the company but 
who nevertheless have the power to influence how products work. If that 
scholarship, described in detail in Part I.A, is correct, design law’s allocation of 
responsibility to companies loses its intellectual foundation and could be subject to 
challenge.  
In addition, saying that companies need to take technical and structural steps 
to implement privacy by design stops far too soon. As described in Part I.B., 
scholars and experts have developed myriad definitions for privacy by design. That 
very diversity poses practical and doctrinal risks. Technology companies trying to 
comply with design law could choose any approach without any clear guidance as 
to whether it will satisfy their obligations. Similarly, judges in different jurisdictions 
trying to determine what the statute requires could opt for different approaches, 
making enforcement arbitrary.  
On top of this confusion is the question of values; in fact, current design law 
appears to reflect a cacophony of values, described in Part I.B., as well. Therefore, 
when judges and regulators turn to the purposes underlying a design law mandate 
to answer new questions,31 their picture is hopelessly unclear. This Section explores 
these gaps in more detail, arguing that privacy’s design law is open to so much 
interpretation that it risks losing much of its power and potential. 
A. Design: Who and When? 
A law’s first job is to allocate responsibility: who is on the hook for 
compliance? Each formulation of privacy by design answers this question in the 
same way: the technology company. In this section, I argue that reflexively allocating 
design law responsibilities this way rests on shaky intellectual grounds and that 
confusion over when “design” occurs creates doctrinal incoherence in privacy’s 
design law. 
1. Corporate Responsibilities During Design 
It seems obvious to almost everyone that technology companies should be 
responsible for implementing privacy by design. The GDPR places design 
obligations on data “controllers”32 and, to a lesser extent, the “producers of the 
products” that “process personal data.”33 Ann Cavoukian, the former Information 
 
31. This is particularly important in Europe, where courts are far more willing than those in the 
United States to interpret a statute in line with its underlying purposes, or telos, and how it fits within 
the overall aims of the European Union. See Jens C. Dammann, The Right to Leave the Eurozone, 48 
TEX. INT’L L. J. 125, 137 (2013); Nial Fennelly, Legal Interpretation at the European Court of Justice, 20 
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 656, 664 (1997); see also Case C-173/06, Agrover Srl v. Agenzia Dogane, 2006 
E.C.R. I-8810, ¶¶ 21–22 (giving “the purpose and general scheme” priority over the wording). 
32. Article 25, section 1 states that a “controller shall” implement privacy by design. Section 2 
puts the onus on controllers to ensure that that their platforms only process user data when necessary. 
See Regulation 2016/679, supra note 1, art. 25, at 48.  
33. Id., recital 78, at 9. 
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and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Canada and one of the earliest proponents 
of privacy by design, placed the burden of implementing her “seven foundational 
principles of privacy by design,” or PbD, on technology companies, as well.34 The 
FTC says that privacy by design refers to companies “promot[ing] consumer privacy 
throughout their organizations and at every stage of the development of their 
products and services.”35 Further, Woodrow Hartzog has written about “design 
boundaries in the form of flexible standards for companies.”36  
Corporate responsibility has intuitive appeal. Currently, we bear the burden of 
protecting our privacy.37 And we are notoriously ill equipped to do so effectively.38 
Data collectors, on the other hand, have considerable power that, in the absence of 
regulation, can be wielded against our interests.39 Indeed, for many platforms that 
depend on a steady stream of personal information for targeted advertising, their 
business interests conflict with privacy.40 Their data use practices can also be used 
to discriminate against marginalized populations.41 Focusing privacy by design 
 
34. CAVOUKIAN, supra note 9. 
35. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 2, at 22.  
36. HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 121. 
37. See id. at 21-25; see also Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the Trans 
Atlantic Consumer Dialogue 4 (Apr. 27, 2010), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/d
ocuments/public_statements/remarks-commissioner-julie-brill/100427tacdspeech.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/EG3M-3QHW] (expressing dissatisfaction with the “traditional opt-out, ‘notice and choice’ 
model” that “inappropriately places the burden on consumers to read and understand lengthy, 
complicated privacy policies that almost no one reads, and no one understands”). 
38. See Ari Ezra Waldman,  
There is No Privacy Paradox: How Cognitive Biases and Design Dark Patterns Affect 
Online Disclosure, CURRENT ISSUES IN PSYCH. __ (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript on file with author). 
39. This is why Jack Balkin, Jonathan Zittrain, and others have proposed changing the legal 
relationship between users and data collectors from one purely based on notice to one based on 
fiduciary law. Under this approach, data collectors could not collect our data and use their power to 
abuse, harm, or violate our trust. See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 
49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016); Jack M. Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain to Make 
Tech Companies Trustworthy, ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016), www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/
2016/10/information-fiduciary/502346 [https://perma.cc/K5CA-8M4C]; see also ARI EZRA 
WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN INFORMATION AGE 79–92 (2018) 
(arguing that understanding privacy as a norm based on trust is essential for justifying the information 
fiduciaries approach); Frank Pasquale, Grand Bargains for Big Data: The Emerging Law of Health 
Information, 72 MD. L. REV. 682, 684 (2013) (“The increasing power of data to be used for both good 
and ill arises from powerful trends within industry and computing science . . . [a]n era of ‘big data’ 
promises exhilarating and frightening opportunities to cure and exploit human vulnerabilities.”).  
40. See, e.g., Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jan Whittington, Free: Accounting for the Costs of the Internet’s 
Most Popular Price, 61 UCLA L. REV. 606, 630 (2014) (noting that “Facebook’s business model is 
focused on attracting third parties into monetized agreements for personal information”). 
41. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for 
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 13–16 (2014) (showing how predictive analytics can 
discriminate against marginalized populations); Sharona Hoffman, Employing E-Health: The Impact of 
Electronic Health Records on the Workplace, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 409, 422 (2010) (“[C]omplex 
scoring algorithms . . . [can] determine which individuals are likely to be high-risk and high-cost 
workers”); Frank Pasquale & Tara Adams Rogone, Protecting Health Privacy in an Era of Big Data 
Processing and Cloud Computing, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 595, 636–37 (2014). 
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mandates on corporate actors interposes necessary friction between consumers and 
powerful data collectors to stop this kind of predation.  
Despite some contrary incentives, technology companies are also most 
efficiently situated to make pro-privacy changes in design. As Guido Calabresi 
argued in the context of allocating responsibility for accidents, liability should be 
laid at the feet of the party who can most easily identify and inexpensively fix the 
problem.42 Between asking users to navigate the labyrinthine path of privacy 
management43 or hack into a platform’s code to protect their privacy, on the one 
hand, and a company’s ability to integrate pro-privacy elements from the ground 
up, on the other, the company has the capacity to more efficiently and effectively 
make a difference. 
And corporate decisions made during the lifecycle of data collection—from 
conception, through design, to implementation—affect our privacy.44 Technology 
products are not built in vacuums. They are built and sold by corporations, 
collections of real persons working toward shared goals45 that can be influenced by 
the people46 and ideas around them.47 New ideas at Microsoft, for example, are 
influenced by CEO Satya Nadella’s deep personal commitment to accessibility.48 
“Move fast and break things,” like the “hacker culture” that inspired that mantra, 
inspires different design values.49 Scholars have shown that companies that consider 
 
42. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
(1970); Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE  
L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972) (the party that could avoid an accident at lowest cost should be liable for the 
accident even if he took due care).   
43. See HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 21–55. 
44. See generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS 
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015). 
45. See Andrew C. Inkpen & Eric W.K. Tsang, Social Capital, Networks, and Knowledge Transfer, 
30 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 146, 148 (2005) (corporations are vertical, structured networks of people 
operating under a unified corporate identity). 
46. See Amy C. Edmondson, The Local and Variegated Nature of Learning in Organizations: A 
Group-Level Perspective, in SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURES AND RELATIONSHIPS 631 
(Mary Goodwyn & Jody Hoffer Gittel eds., 2012).  
47. Adopting Bruno Latour’s distinction between the “ostensive” and the “performative” 
aspects of behavior, see Bruno Latour, The Powers of Association, 32 SOC. REV. 264, 264 (1984), Martha 
Feldman and Brian Pentland argue that executives are responsible for the “ostensive” aspect of  
routines: setting the tone for action, laying out a mission, and creating policies that form best practice 
guides. Then, routines are “performed” by workers on the ground: real people doing real work 
translating ideas into action. Martha S. Feldman & Brian T. Pentland, Reconceptualizing Organizational 
Routines as a Source of Flexibility and Change, 48 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 94, 101 (2003). 
48. See Satya Nadella, The Moment that Forever Changed Our Lives, MICROSOFT (Oct. 21, 2017), 
https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/accessibility/2017/10/21/satya-nadella-the-moment-that-forever-
changed-our-lives/ [https://perma.cc/YPP5-JAD3]; see also Interview with Jules Cohen, Principal 
Program Manager, Privacy, in Redmond, WA (Aug. 8, 2017) (notes on file with author) (noting that 
accessibility is one of four factors always considered when developing new ideas particularly because of 
Nadella’s personal commitment to the issue). 
49. See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy: Technology, Privacy, and Shifting 
Social Norms, 16 YALE J.L.  & TECH. 59, 93 (2014) (“Engineers should be mindful of the fact that 
products and services that they design are intended (also) for non-engineers. The Silicon Valley culture, 
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user privacy concerns from day one are more likely to have respect for privacy 
integrated into their corporate culture and, as a result, the products they sell.50 
Therefore, encouraging corporate-wide respect for privacy by making corporations 
responsible for design law during a broad timeline of design encourages the entire 
company to take privacy seriously. 
2. The Sociology of Technology 
But that argument has a blind spot. It presumes the process of design is 
complete by the time the manufacturer starts selling its product and, thus, is entirely 
within the corporation’s control.51 However, science and technology scholars teach 
us that design itself is not limited to teams of engineers working for a company. It 
is a long-term, iterative social process that incorporates everything from a 
company’s ethos to user innovations post product release. As a result, the 
technology company does not always have the last word in design.52 This raises two 
important questions that scholars, judges, and regulators working in design law have 
yet to answer: First, if design is not exclusively a corporate project, why should 
corporations be exclusively responsible for designing for privacy before users ever 
see the product, especially since different users have different privacy preferences? 
 
dubbed the ‘hacker way’ by Mark Zuckerberg, founder of Facebook, whose corporate credo is 
‘move fast and break things,’ is not always aligned with broader societal values and expectations.”). 
50. Oshrat Ayalon et al., How Developers Make Design Decisions About Users’ Privacy: The Place 
of Professional Communities and Organizational Climate, in COMPANION OF THE 2017 ACM 
CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK AND SOCIAL COMPUTING 135 
(finding that a corporate climate dedicated to privacy has a more significant effect on engineers’ 
approach to privacy than internal policies, law, or corporate education programs). 
51. Such control is often an important factor in the allocation of civil responsibility. In certain 
jurisdictions, for example, the tort doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, which helps victims prove liability when 
an accident could not have happened without negligence. See Cal. Evid. Code § 646 cmt. (West 1970); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 17 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2005) 
(requiring that the instrumentality of harm be under the defendant’s control); see also Schmidt v. Gibbs, 
807 S.W.2d 928, 931 (Ark. 1991); Hall v. Chastain, 273 S.E.2d 12, 14 (Ga. 1980) (quoting Chenall v. 
Palmer Brick Co., 43 S.E. 443 (Ga. 1903)). Premises liability, or the duty to take affirmative steps to 
protect individuals coming onto one’s land, is predicated on the idea that landowners and occupiers are 
the ones in control or possession of land. See, e.g., Rogers v. Jones, 56 Cal. App. 3d 346, 350 (1976). 
And in copyright law, we hold some third parties vicariously liable for the infringements of others only 
if they had the “right and ability to control” the infringer’s behavior. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023–24 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930–31 (2005). 
52. And where control and its effects are not so easily assigned, the civil law often declines to 
hold only one party responsible. The doctrine of comparative fault, for example, metes out liability only 
according to the defendants’ level of harm caused. See, e.g., Weidenfeller v. Star & Garter, 1 Cal. App. 
4th 1, 6 (1991) (stating that the purpose of comparative fault is “to prevent the unfairness of requiring 
a tortfeasor who is only minimally culpable as compared to the other parties to bear all the damages”); 
see KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORM AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 144 (1997). Market share 
liability is another example of civil law refusing to hold someone fully responsible when fault cannot be 
easily assigned; it limits generic drug manufacturers’ exposure based on the likelihood their particular 
drug caused harm. See, e.g., Allen Rostron, Beyond Market Share Liability: A Theory of Proportional Share 
Liability for Nonfungible Products, 52 UCLA L. REV. 151, 154 (2004). 
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Second, what if users are at least partly responsible for the harm caused by 
technology, like when racists on Twitter hijacked Microsoft’s AI chatbot and turned 
it into a Hitler-quoting Nazi?53 
Indeed, presumptive corporate responsibility reflects actor-network theory, a 
particular, value-laden view of design that assigns agency to engineers, and 
according to critics, erases users. Actor-network theory generally posits that artifacts 
(like machines) do not just emerge out of nowhere; rather, they come into existence 
as products of social relations, or actor-networks.54 A good example of an actor-
network in this context is a technology company like Google, Apple, Dropbox, or 
any other small or large corporation. Executives, designers, marketers, and other 
stakeholders interact with each other through corporate protocols and horizontal 
teams to achieve a unitary goal of a new product, version, or platform. Users barely 
factor into this model. 
But as Susan Leigh Star has argued, this approach ends up focusing almost 
entirely on the efforts of (mostly male) designers, or the ones that have the power 
to position themselves with the right tools, with the right allies, and at the right 
moment to push their designs to the forefront.55 Designers, then, become the 
heroes of technology and society and the obvious bases of responsibility for design 
law.56 This model, however, is overwhelmingly wealthy, white, and male, and 
ignores the contributions of marginalized groups, social movements and activism, 
and other social forces.57 
The sociologist Steve Woolgar took a small step toward recognizing a broader 
conception of design.58 He argued that designers “configure” users by learning from 
beta tests and designing technology so it can only be used in certain ways, thus 
limiting mistakes or other barriers to use.59 For just two examples, think of how our 
computer ports are designed for specific inputs (a USB cable, for example, will not 
 
53. See Elle Hunt, Tay, Microsoft’s AI Chatbot, Gets a Crash Course in Racism from Twitter, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2016, 2:41 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/mar/24/tay-
microsofts-ai-chatbot-gets-a-crash-course-in-racism-from-twitter [https://perma.cc/4QKP-RPMT]. 
54. See Albena Yaneva, Making the Social Hold: Toward an Actor-Network Theory of Design,  
1 DESIGN & CULTURE 273 (2009); see also LATOUR, supra note 30, at 9–16. 
55. See Susan Leigh Star, Power, Technology and the Phenomenon of Conventions, in  
TECHNOSCIENCE: THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTIONS 88–99 (Kristin Asdal, et. al eds., 2007). 
56. This is reminiscent of the so-called “great man” theory of history. See, e.g., THOMAS 
CARLYLE, ON HEROES, HERO-WORSHIP AND THE HEROIC IN HISTORY (1840) (seeing men like 
Muhammad, Shakespeare, Martin Luther, Rousseau, and Napoleon as the primary movers of history); 
FREDERICK ADAMS WOODS, THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS (1913) (studying 386 rulers in Western 
Europe from the 12th century until the French revolution to show their influence on history).  
57. See, e.g., Kate Crawford, Artificial Intelligence’s White Guy Problem, N.Y. TIMES ( June  
25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/artificial-intelligences-white-guy-
problem.html [https://perma.cc/DN8Y-TA5D] (discussing the existence and effects of implicit bias 
in future technology design given that most technology designers are white men). 
58. See generally Steve Woolgar, Configuring the User: The Case of Usability Trials, in A 
SOCIOLOGY OF MONSTERS: ESSAYS ON POWER, TECHNOLOGY AND DOMINATION ( John Law ed., 
1991). 
59. Id. at 59, 61. 
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fit in a Parallel Port) or the restrictions imposed by digital rights management.60 
Users exist in this model; their input is, in fact, essential to the design process. But 
they are, at best, represented by designers in a process that takes place entirely within 
the walls of the technology company.61 Male designers, and their employers, still 
remain the center of attention.  
Like actor-network theory, Woolgar’s approach was also criticized as too one-
way. The configuration and constraint in Woolgar’s work was limited to the 
activities of heroic actors within the company that produced the technology. But 
other people are involved too. Designers usually have to follow mandates from 
executives and internal stakeholders.62 Exogenous forces play roles as well, 
including journalists who call attention to design’s faults or data breaches, public-
sector agencies that regulate technologies, policy makers that pass laws about them, 
and social movements that advocate for just and fair uses of technology.63  
And users do more than just follow restrictions laid out by designers. As Wiebe 
Bijker and Trevor Pinch have shown, users are one of the many social groups 
influencing design.64 Whereas Woolgar used the term “encoding” to describe the 
mostly technological process in which engineers embed constraints on user 
behavior into technology products,65 other scholars recognized that users have their 
own “decoding” to do, a process during which users often identify entirely new uses 
for machines.66 For example, when rural farmers, who initially resisted the 
automobile as a threat to their way of life, started using the Model T as a stationary 
power source on their farms, they became “agents of technological change”: the 
next iteration of the car better reflected the ways in which these farmers were 
 
60. See Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575, 580–88 (2003).  
61. See, e.g., SUSAN DOUGLAS, INVENTING AMERICAN BROADCASTING, 1899-1922 (1987) 
(users developed new ways to deploy radio); CLAUDE FISCHER, AMERICA CALLING: A SOCIAL 
HISTORY OF THE TELEPHONE TO 1940 (1992); MICHELLE MARTIN, HELLO, CENTRAL?: GENDER 
TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE IN THE FORMATION OF TELEPHONE SYSTEMS (1991) (women started 
using the telephone to alleviate loneliness in rural areas, surprising telephone companies and forcing 
changes to telephone construction); Ronald Kline & Trevor Pinch, Users as Agents of Technological 
Change: The Social Construction of the Automobile in the Rural United States, 37 TECH. & CUL. 763,  
768–94 (1996) (showing how farmers used the car as a stationary power source, ultimately contributing 
to changes in design). 
62. See, e.g., Kline & Pinch, supra note 61, at 741–44; Nelly Oudshoorn, Els Rommes, & Marcelle 
Stienstra, Configuring the User as Everybody: Gender and Design Cultures in Information and 
Communication Technologies, 29 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 30 (2004). 
63. See, e.g., Jessika van Kammen, Do Users Matter?, in BODIES OF TECHNOLOGY (A. Saetnan et 
al. eds., 2000); Nelly Oudshoorn, On Masculinities, Technologies and Pain: The Testing of Male 
Contraceptive Technologies in the Clinic and the Media, 24 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 265 (1999). 
64. See Trevor J. Pinch & Weibe E. Bijker, The Social Construction of Facts and Artifacts: Or 
How the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit from Each Other, in THE SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS (Wiebe Bijker et al. eds., 1987) (describing the 
author’s social construction of technology, or SCOT, model). 
65. See Woolgar, supra note 58, at 39. 
66. Hugh Mackay et al., Reconfiguring the User: Using Rapid Application Development, 30  
SOC. STUD. SCI. 737, 739, 750, 752 (2000). 
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deploying it.67 Bijker has shown that when the high-wheeled bicycle was introduced, 
older men refused to use it, designating it as unsafe, which paved the way for the 
development of a new, safer, smaller-wheeled bicycle several years later.68 Indeed, 
many scholars have recognized that users identify new uses for products that 
designers never intended, thus ultimately changing the design.69  
Already, the neat narrative of design as an exclusively corporate or engineering 
project that ends at product release is at least fuzzier. Feminist approaches to 
technology break down the corporate narrative entirely. Ruth Schwartz Cowan 
pioneered feminist considerations of technology by looking at “the consumption 
junction,” the place and time at which consumers make choices between competing 
products.70 This scholarship outright rejects the idea that design begins and ends 
with scientists and engineers and highlights the fact that women played 
extraordinarily important roles in design. Feminist scholars then showed that 
women helped change the design of many technological artifacts,71 including the 
microwave,72 reproductive technologies,73 computers,74 and household devices.75 
The takeaway from this literature is that design is not complete until users have 
defined the uses and social valence of the technology in their hands. And different 
users may define technology’s uses in different ways. Simplified models of heroic 
male engineers doing work on their own or standing in for some objective 
conception of the user risks further burdening marginalized groups and missing half 
the narrative of design. This speaks to the who and when of privacy’s design law. If 
design extends beyond product release, then privacy’s design law should impose 
design obligations throughout the entire lifecycle of technologies, from conception 
 
67. See Kline & Pinch, supra note 61. 
68. See WEIBE E. BIJKER, OF BICYCLES, BAKELITES AND BULBS: TOWARD A THEORY OF 
SOCIOTECHNICAL CHANGE (1995) (describing the evolution of design changes to bicycles based, in 
part, on impact from users and other social groups independent of designers). 
69. See, e.g., DOUGLAS, supra note 61 (amateur radio operators helped make the technology a 
medium for broadcasting rather than just one-to-one communication); FISCHER, supra note 61 
(discussing how users developed new ways to use the telephone, particularly outside cities); MARTIN, 
supra note 61 (showing how rural women used the telephone in ways so unexpected to the engineers 
that designed it that they had to redesign it significantly); DAVID E. NYE, ELECTRIFYING AMERICA: 
SOCIAL MEANINGS OF A NEW TECHNOLOGY, 1880-1940 (1990) (discussing how communities used 
electricity and electric appliances, streetlights, and trolleys in ways that advanced social goals). 
70. See Ruth Schwartz Cowan, The Consumption Junction: A Proposal for Research Strategies in 
the Sociology of Technology, in THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS (Wiebe 
Bijker et al. eds., 1987).  
71. See Nina E. Lerman, Arwen Palmer Mohun & Ruth Oldenziel, The Shoulders We Stand on 
and the View from Here: Historiography and Directions for Research, 38 TECH. & CULT. 9, 11 (1997). 
72. CYNTHIA COCKBURN & SUSAN ORMROD, GENDER AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE MAKING 
(1993). 
73. See, e.g., ADELE CLARKE & VIRGINIA OLESEN, REVISIONING WOMEN, HEALTH, AND 
HEALING: FEMINIST, CULTURAL, AND TECHNOSCIENCE PERSPECTIVES (1998). 
74. See, e.g., SHERRY TURKLE, THE SECOND SELF: COMPUTERS AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT 
(1984). 
75. See, e.g., RUTH SCHWARTZ COWEN, MORE WORK FOR MOTHER: THE IRONIES OF 
HOUSEHOLD TECHNOLOGIES FROM THE OPEN HEARTH TO THE MICROWAVE (1983). 
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to use, not just up to the moment of sale. Moreover, if users play essential roles in 
design, asking companies to design for privacy before users have a chance to deploy 
new products imposes unrealistic burdens. Engineers and users may not play 
identical roles in design; but the sociology of technology complicates the implicit 
narrative that the technology company is the sole locus of design responsibilities.  
B. Privacy: What, Why, and How? 
If the who and when of design law are hazy, what design law’s obligations are in 
practice and why they are imposed are entirely obscured. In this section, I review the 
privacy by design and values in design literatures and tease out eight different visions 
privacy by design in practice and a similarly diverse pool of values they are meant 
to promote. I then argue that this diversity of views and lack of clarity may prove 
fatal to privacy by design as it transitions into design law. More specifically, if no 
one knows either the requirements or the purposes of design law, then whether a 
given strategy meets a legal requirement or falls below a legal standard is either 
impossible to tell or entirely arbitrary. This also makes it difficult for those 
victimized by privacy-invasive design to know how to seek redress. 
1. Privacy by Design’s Many Definitions (What?) 
Definitions of privacy by design have always started with the Fair Information 
Practice Principles (FIPPs), which developed out of a 1973 report from the U.S. 
Department of Housing, Education, and Welfare (HEW).76 The HEW Report 
recommended that users be informed of data use practices, have the opportunity to 
correct their data, and consent to any secondary uses of their information.77 The 
Report also called on companies to be transparent about their data use practices, set 
limits on what data they gather (also known as data minimization), sunset data 
retention, and maintain appropriate levels of security.78 Some of these same 
principles—data minimization, access, transparency, and, particularly, consent—are 
 
76. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE 
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED 
PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS (1973), http://www.epic.org/privacy/hew1973report/ [https:// 
perma.cc/3ATG-ABEM] [hereinafter “HEW REPORT”]. As Marc Rotenberg has explained, “[n]ot 
only have Fair Information Practices played a significant role in framing privacy laws in the United 
States, these basic principles have also contributed to the development of privacy laws around the world 
and even to the development of important international guidelines for privacy protection.” Marc 
Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 44 (2001). Unfortunately, the FIPPs inadequately protect our privacy in a digital 
age. See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Privacy Harms and the Effectiveness of the Notice and Choice 
Framework, 11 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 485, 490–96 (2015) (discussing the drawbacks to 
notice and choice). 
77. HEW REPORT, supra note 76, at 41–42. 
78. Because the FIPPs are an evolving set of recommendations, this summary is based on Paul 
M. Schwartz & William M. Treanor, The New Privacy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2163, 2181 (2003). 
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embedded in the GDPR.79 Recital 78 explicitly includes four of the FIPPs: data 
minimization, transparency, access, and security.80 It would be easy, therefore, to 
interpret the GDPR’s version of privacy by design as little more than the FIPPs.81 
Indeed, the FIPPs are also at the core of a second definition of privacy by 
design. When Ann Cavoukian described her seven “foundational” principles PbD, 
she was either consciously or unconsciously relying on the FIPPs. The principles—
Proactive not Reactive; Privacy as a Default Setting; Privacy Embedded into Design; 
Full Functionality; End-to-End Security; Visibility and Transparency; and Respect 
for User Privacy82—echo principles of user control and transparency that were in 
the HEW Report. Like the FIPPs, as Ira Rubinstein and Nathan Good have argued, 
these principles are either repetitive (the first three principles are siblings, if not 
triplets) or so broad that they provide little additional guidance beyond the general 
notion that privacy by design is about “considering privacy issues early in the design 
process.”83 
A third vision of privacy by design may be just as unhelpful. The FTC says 
that privacy by design refers to companies “promot[ing] consumer privacy 
throughout their organizations and at every stage of the development of their 
products and services.”84 On the ground, that has translated into requiring 
companies to adopt privacy programs that include design considerations.  
For example, in March 2011, the FTC required Google to “design and  
implement[ ] . . . reasonable privacy controls and procedures” in response to a 
privacy risk assessment.85 It required the same of Facebook later that year.86 But the 
FTC has never explained what that means in practice. 
Scholars have tried to fill that void with three other approaches to privacy by 
design.87 Ira Rubinstein has related privacy by design to privacy-enhancing 
 
79. Indeed, Article 25 lists “data minimization” as a governing “privacy principle.” Regulation 
2016/679, supra note 1, art. 25, at 48. 
80. Id., recital 78, at 9. 
81. See Woodrow Hartzog, The Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices, 76  
MD. L. REV. 952, 955–56 (2017) (calling the GDPR a “FIPs-based law . . . .”). 
82. CAVOUKIAN, supra note 9. 
83. Rubinstein & Good, supra note 10, at 1338. 
84.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 2, at 22.  
85. In the Matter of Google Inc., F.T.C. File No. 102 3136, at 5 (Mar. 30, 2011) (consent 
order), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/03/110330googlebuzz 
agreeorder.pdf [https://perma.cc/S72R-WNXA]. 
86. In the Matter of Facebook, Inc., F.T.C. File No. 092 3184, at 6 (Nov. 29, 2011), https://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/11/111129facebookagree.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/A8DX-Q7RM]. 
87. That project arguably began with the values in design movement. Helen Nissenbaum and 
Mary Flanagan have shown how designers integrate values into the products they create. Although their 
project focused on digital games, the lessons for privacy by design are clear: design is not neutral, and 
reflects normative decisions about what technology should look like. See, e.g., BATYA FRIEDMAN, 
HUMAN VALUES AND THE DESIGN OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY (1997) (challenging the idea that 
efficiency and functionality are the central foci of design and showing how values are integrated into 
new products); HELEN NISSENBAUM & MARY FLANAGAN, VALUES AT PLAY IN DIGITAL GAMES 
(2014); Katie Shilton, Technology Development with an Agenda: Interventions to Emphasize Values in 
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technologies, or engineering tools that translate specific data protection laws into 
code.88 By way of example, Rubinstein and Good explain that privacy by design 
should require companies not merely to promise to delete user data after a limited 
amount of time but rather to design a database that automatically identifies personal 
information and deletes it at a pre-programmed date.89 Kenneth Bamberger and 
Deirdre Mulligan suggest that privacy by design includes organizational measures 
that integrate privacy professionals into a technology company’s various business 
units.90 Elsewhere, I have argued that companies need to go further, integrating 
lawyers and privacy professionals into design teams and acculturating designers 
themselves into the ethos of privacy and ethics in design.91 This scholarship has 
helped privacy by design grow from a catchphrase to a doctrine. But the diversity 
of approaches to that doctrine means that design law is still unclear. 
Woodrow Hartzog offers a seventh conception of privacy by design that 
leverages various legal tools to guide the design of technologies that affect our 
privacy. Hartzog calls on the law to “set boundaries and goals” for technology 
design.92 For example, a design agenda for privacy that leverages contract, tort, and 
consumer protection law would respond to the problem of “extracted consent,” 
that is, the way technology companies design interfaces, agreements, and click boxes 
to manipulate, nudge, and encourage us to acquiesce to a data-sucking regime.93 
This and other important steps in the ecosystem of privacy by design scholarship 
recognize that the law has to play a role in design. But while Hartzog identifies the 
legal levers that can rein in technology’s data-hungry excesses,94 judges and 
regulators still require a doctrinal map for answering specific privacy by design 
questions as they appear. 
The GDPR brings the eighth and most recent formulation of privacy by 
design, but it is a surprisingly vague one. 95 Article 25, Section 1 of the GDPR states 
that data controllers have to “implement appropriate technical and organisational 
measures such as pseudonymisation, which are designed to implement data-
protection principles, such as data minimization, in an effective manner.”96 Recital 
78 goes into more detail, including a list of potential measures that might, if 
implemented, help a company comply with Article 25.97 Such steps include 
 
Design, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AM. SOC. FOR INFO. SCI. &  
TECH. (2010). 
88. See Ira Rubinstein, Regulating Privacy by Design, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1409, 1414–28 
(2012). 
89. Rubinstein & Good, supra note 10, at 1341–42. 
90. See KENNETH BAMBERGER & DEIRDRE MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE  
GROUND: DRIVING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 76–86 (2015). 
91. See Ari Ezra Waldman, Designing Without Privacy, 55 HOUSTON L. REV. 659 (2018). 
92. HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 7. 
93. Id. at 211–13. 
94. Id.  
95. Regulation 2016/679, supra note 1, art. 25, at 48. 
96. Id.  
97. Id. at recital 78, at 9. 
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“minimising the processing of personal data, pseudonymising personal data as soon 
as possible, transparency with regard to the functions and processing of personal 
data, enabling the data subject to monitor the data processing, [and] enabling the 
controller to create and improve security features.”98 This list of examples is helpful, 
but only to a point. As a incomplete list of technical measures, it offers companies 
a quick guide to model their own compliance mechanisms.99 But it does not speak 
to any organizational measures that are necessary. Nor is the language of the GDPR 
at all specific. The core of Article 25’s language is the requirement to take technical 
and organizational steps “which are designed to implement data protection 
principles . . . in an effective manner.”100 Those principles, from consent to data 
minimization to security, are covered in other parts of the GDPR. That turns Article 
25’s version of privacy by design into a catch-all provision with no specific 
requirements of its own. 
2. Privacy by Design’s Many Values (Why?) 
Design is not neutral. Technologies reflect the values embedded in them.101 
That makes values particularly relevant for design law. As a product of many 
different views, design law today reflects a cacophony of values, some of which are 
conflicting. For example, Cavoukian’s PbD talks about transparency, consent, and 
security, among other things,102 reflecting the idea that privacy by design’s purpose 
is to give consumers power and control over their data.103 Woodrow Hartzog 
suggests that privacy by design should focus on values like trust and obscurity. That 
is, because trust is essential to privacy in the digital age,104 design should focus on 
building trust and confidence.  
 
98. Id. 
99. See Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 
408 nn. 359–60 (2009) (noting legislatures giving nonexhaustive lists of rules and broad instructions). 
100. Regulation 2016/679, supra note 1, art. 25, at 48. 
101. See, e.g., HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 95–119; see also Batya Friedman & Peter Kahn,  
Jr., Human Values, Ethics, and Design, in THE HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION HANDBOOK 
11771201 (Andrew Sears & Julie Jacko eds., 2d ed. 2008) (arguing that some values implicated in 
design include freedom from bias and discrimination, property, and calmness). 
102. See CAVOUKIAN, supra note 9. 
103. Indeed, control has become the “archetype” in privacy law. HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 63; 
see also ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). Privacy-as-control is also a favorite in 
industry. During testimony before the United States Senate in April 2018, Facebook CEO Mark 
Zuckerberg talked about returning control over privacy to consumers fifty-four times. See Facebook, 
Social Media Privacy, and the Use and Abuse of Data, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, S. Comm. on  
Commerce, Sci., and Transp. Joint Full Comm. Hearing, 115th Cong. (2018), https:// 
www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/facebook-social-media-privacy-and-the-use-and-abuse-of-data 
[https://perma.cc/58AK-DVLA]; see also Transcript of Mark Zuckerberg’s Senate Hearing, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/04/10/ 
transcript-of-mark-zuckerbergs-senate-hearing/?utm_term=.b7cf575c7106  [https://perma.cc/DR 
W5-BC86]. 
104. See HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 97–107 (discussing various aspects of trust in privacy law); 
WALDMAN, supra note 39, at 1–10, 47–76 (arguing that privacy is based on relationships of trust 
between individuals and, thus, can protect the value of trust); Jessica Litman, Information 
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Frederic Stutzman and Hartzog argue that obscurity functions as a privacy 
value because when our information is hard to collect—namely, when it is in 
disparate corners of the internet or sitting in dusty file cabinets in town halls—only 
a few people will actually be willing to put in the time, money, and effort to identify 
us.105 Placing boundaries around data collection can make us more obscure from 
commercial surveillance. Obscurity, then, can also be designed in. 
But so can trust, or control, or whatever value a designer, corporation, 
legislator, regulator, or law professor prefers. The diverse pool of sometimes 
overlapping and sometimes conflicting ideas about privacy and design, which mirror 
the patchwork state of privacy scholarship as a whole,106 puts design law at risk.  
3. The Effects of Confusion (How?) 
When language can mean almost anything, it means almost nothing. Design 
law could mean anything from following the FIPPs to making technological changes 
to platforms to integrating lawyers into more diverse design teams. And the law’s 
purposes and goals could be minimal or ambitious. Vague statutes have pernicious 
side effects that leave design law open to attack in four related ways, crippling our 
ability to vindicate our rights to privacy-centered design. 
A vague design statute cannot guide corporate behavior appropriately.107 If 
design law fails to provide sufficient notice of its requirements, companies cannot 
know what actions, changes, or new strategies regulators want.108 That kind of 
vagueness is costly and can hamper the goals of design law in the first place. Vague 
requirements allow predatory companies to make minor, superficial changes and 
claim their obligations fulfilled.109  
 
Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1308–10 (2000); Neil Richards & Woodrow 
Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431, 451–57 (2016) (protecting 
privacy can build trust between online platforms and consumers); Kirsten Martin, Transaction Costs, 
Privacy, and Trust: The Laudable Goals and Ultimate Failure of Notice and Choice to Respect Privacy 
Online, 18 FIRST MONDAY 12 (DEC. 2, 2013), http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/
view/4838/3802 [https://perma.cc/GV7L-NDNN]; Katherine Strandburg, Freedom of Association in 
a Networked World: First Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741 (2008). 
105. See HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 110–11; Frederic Stutzman & Woodrow Hartzog, The Case 
for Online Obscurity, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2013).  
106. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 1 (2008) (calling privacy a “concept in 
disarray”). 
107. This is akin to the arguments in support of the void for vagueness doctrine. See, e.g., 
Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (a law is unconstitutionally vague when people 
“of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning”). 
108. The Supreme Court made this same argument in Kolender v. Lawson, which overturned a 
vague loitering statute. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). 
109. See EDELMAN, supra note 18 (showing how companies create structures that frustrate the 
substantive goals of anti-discrimination law); see also Josh Constine, A Flaw-by-Flaw Guide to Facebook’s 
New GDPR Privacy Changes, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 18, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/17/
facebook-gdpr-changes/ [https://perma.cc/J7RE-VBV6] (showing how many of the changes 
Facebook made to its platform to comply with the GDPR are manipulative, superficial, and not 
designed with ease of use in mind). 
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Without guidance for regulators, design law risks becoming under-inclusive. 
Judges, regulators, or practitioners could glom on to a single easy, understandable, 
or cheap-to-implement value and run with it, narrowing design law in the same way 
American privacy law reflects a scaled-down version of the FIPPs.110 There is 
already some evidence this might happen. In the United States, for example, privacy 
law fetishizes consent and control while ignoring other elements of privacy.111 Our 
consent obsession is one reason why privacy plaintiffs have had difficulty exercising 
their privacy rights in court.112 Judges often respond to claims of data misuse by 
noting that users consented to share their information in the first place and assumed 
the risk that it would be shared with others.113 Selectively interpreting privacy 
principles is happening on the ground as well. Recent research into how technology 
companies operationalize privacy law into the corporate practice and routine 
suggests that easy-to-understand and high-profile mandates like security tend to 
crowd out more complicated and nuanced requirements of privacy.114 This could 
happen again with privacy by design. 
Vague terms make it difficult for consumers to distinguish corporate 
malfeasance from corporate compliance, thus disempowering consumer voices 
both in the market and at law. This is true across a variety of areas of law. For 
example, confusion as what constitutes a “famous” trademark complicates 
trademark holders’ decisions to pursue dilution claims.115 Ambiguities in civil 
procedure rules make it difficult for parties to know their procedural rights and 
obligations.116 Vague terms in patent claims leave future inventors unsure as to the 
patent’s coverage117 and encourages rent-seeking patent litigation.118 In all of these 
 
110. See Rotenberg, supra note 76. 
111. See HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 62–67. 
112. It isn’t the only reason. Plaintiffs have also had trouble articulating “concrete and 
particularized” damages from privacy and data breach harms. See, e.g., Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 
(2016). But see Solove & Citron, supra note 15 (arguing that courts should apply the long history of 
recognizing intangible, yet no less devastating harms, to privacy cases). 
113. See, e.g., In re Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig., No. Civ. 04-126, 2004 WL 1278459 (D. Minn. 
June 6, 2004); Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). 
114. See Waldman, Designing Without Privacy, supra note 91, at 697–99. 
115. See, e.g., Sandra L. Rierson, The Myth and Reality of Dilution, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 
212, 303 n. 393 (2012) (vagueness in the term “famous” makes it difficult to know when a trademark 
plaintiff is entitled to sue for dilution of a famous mark). 
116. See Arthur F. Greenbaum, Jacks or Better to Open: Procedural Limitations on Co-Party and 
Third-Party Claims, 74 MINN. L. REV. 507, 534 (1990) (discussing ambiguities in Rule 18(a) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
117. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim 
Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1745 (2009) (“[C]laim construction may be inherently 
indeterminate: it may simply be impossible to cleanly map words to things. Patent attorneys seize on 
such indeterminacy to excuse infringement or to expand their client’s exclusive rights.”). 
118. Jonathan L. Moore, Particularizing Patent Pleading: Pleading Patent Infringement in a  
Post-Twombly World, 18 TEX. INTEL. PROP. L.J. 451, 486 (2010) (“Further, the scope of 
a patent’s claim is typically ambiguous and it is difficult to know with any certainty how a court will 
construe it. This fact benefits nuisance-value plaintiffs, as it allows them to bring actions that lack 
merit.”) (footnote omitted). 
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cases, ambiguities in the law make litigation more costly and thus discourage 
potential plaintiffs from pursuing legal action to vindicate their rights. Unclear 
design law may, therefore, silence users and eliminate public interest impact 
litigation as a privacy enforcement tool.119 
Further, vague laws make enforcement arbitrary. If design law can refer to no 
less than eight different practical requirements, each sitting somewhere on a range 
from lax to strict, governments, regulators, and DPAs can determine whom to 
investigate and what version of the law they want to apply based on their prejudices 
or politics. That undermines the rule of law and makes it impossible for consumers 
to know when and how to pursue their design law rights. Justice O’Connor made 
this point in a decision striking down a criminal vagrancy and loitering law as 
unconstitutionally vague: vague statutes permit “a standardless sweep [that] allow 
policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections.”120 It is 
not difficult to imagine a scenario where a vigorous pro-privacy enforcer in France 
takes an aggressive view of the design law embedded in the GDPR but a pro-
business political appointee at the FTC adopts the most lax interpretation of privacy 
by design.121 This eventuality could weaken the reach and dramatically undermine 
the power of privacy’s design law, thus highlighting the need for clear, doctrinal 
guides to interpret its practical requirements. 
II. INTERPRETING DESIGN LAW 
The current vague approaches to privacy by design leave the who, what, when, 
why, and how of design law open to wildly different interpretations. That much is 
arguably clear. That is particularly problematic for an area of law that seeks to 
influence behavior ex ante (before product release) rather than ex post (after 
something goes wrong). Those responsible for compliance need to know what the 
law requires of them; those responsible for interpreting the law need to know how 
to answer questions as they come up; those who are meant to benefit from the law 
need to know what to expect and how to vindicate their rights. Therefore, everyone 
needs doctrinal and practical guides or analogies. 
Fortunately, we do not have to reinvent the wheel. This is not the first time 
society has been confronted with new, mass-produced technologies that can cause 
 
119. Private litigation has played an important role in enhancing consumer safety before. See 
AM. ASS’N FOR JUSTICE, DRIVEN TO SAFETY: HOW LITIGATION SPURRED AUTO SAFETY 
INNOVATIONS 4–49 (2010); see also Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980) (side impact 
protection); Seliner v. Ford Motor Co., No. 2002-30454 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 2004) (safe doors); Dyson  
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (car companies must design “a reasonably 
safe container within which to make [a] journey”); AlliedSignal, Inc. v. Moran, 231 S.W.3d 16  
(Tex. App. 2007) (seat belts); Shipler v. Gen. Motors Corp., 710 N.W.2d 807 (2006) (safe roofs); 
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757 (1992) (Ford Pinto case). 
120. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) 
121. But see William McGeveran, Friending the Privacy Regulators, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 959 (2016) 
(challenging the conventional wisdom that European data regulators are aggressive and their American 
counterparts are lax). 
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harm without us knowing. The common law doctrine of products liability 
developed in a technological, economic, and social context analogous to current 
technological landscape. And it emerged to answer the same who, what, when, why, 
and how questions plaguing privacy’s design law. Granted, products liability 
established norms and requirements for corporate behavior through tort litigation 
and focused on manufactured products that endangered our health and safety.122 
Privacy by design is a statute directed at data collection tools. But despite those 
differences, a privacy by design statute can learn a lot from products liability today. 
This Part makes a three-step argument. First, I suggest that products liability 
arose in a social context similar to today’s, just with different technologies, to answer 
similar questions plaguing privacy’s law of design. Second, I establish a taxonomy 
of how products liability doctrines can influence design, ultimately focusing on the 
way in which it can operate as an effective analogy to describe, in a different context, 
what privacy by design should mean as a legal requirement. And third, I apply that 
analogy to create a model for design law, thus translating privacy by design into a 
clear legal mandate. 
A. The Products Liability Parallel 
Products liability developed out of a series of court decisions to address harm 
caused by mass-produced goods. Though originally written in the language of 
“strict” liability,123 products liability never reached the apotheosis of absolute 
manufacturer liability for all harms caused by products on the market.124 Section 
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which has been widely cited and 
 
122. It also emerged because traditional claims for injury from faulty or defective products failed 
because of the privity doctrine, which stated that a party only has a duty to those with whom there was 
a contractual relationship. See Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M&W 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842). The 
fact that there is often privity between technology companies and users through agreement to terms of 
service or privacy policies does not alter my argument for three reasons. First, privacy policies are not 
always considered contracts. See, e.g., In re Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig., No. 04-126 (PAM/JSM), 2004 
WL 1278459, at *6 (D. Minn. June 6, 2004) (“The usual rule in contract cases is that ‘general statements 
of policy are not contractual.”) (quoting Martens v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 616 N.W.2d 732, 740 
(Minn. 2000) (en banc))); Dyer v. Nw. Airlines Corp., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 (D.N.D. 2004) 
(explaining that “broad statements of company policy do not generally give rise to contract claims”); 
RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 17:68 (2012) (“Despite the lack of a 
bilateral offer and acceptance, privacy policies may become part of a contractual arrangement . . . .”). 
Second, even where there is privity, privacy plaintiffs have been routinely denied access to justice, much 
like those injured by defective products. See, e.g., Solove & Citron, supra note 15. Third, I am not arguing 
that technology companies that create tools that collect our data should be subject to strict liability or 
products liability when something goes wrong. Others have made that argument. See infra notes 151160 
and accompanying text. Rather, I argue that products liability can serve as an analogy to specify privacy 
by design’s requirements. For that argument, privity is immaterial. 
123. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461–66 (1944) 
(Traynor, J., concurring) (arguing that the company’s liability should not be found in negligence, but 
merely because it caused the harm). 
124. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Echoes of Enterprise Liability in Product Design and Marketing 
Litigation, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 958, 958–59 (2002). 
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adopted,125 holds liable one who manufactures and sells a “product in a defective 
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user” that causes harm after reaching the 
consumer in substantially “the condition in which it was sold.”126 Over time, state 
court judges have developed several standards, definitions, and tests for 
determining when a product is defective.127 Many of those tests can also help tease 
out the details of privacy’s law of design. 
Products liability arose because judges recognized that the new socioeconomic 
relationship between consumers and twentieth century technologies required 
something more than just simple negligence. In fact, the same social factors that 
gave rise to products liability in the first place mirror the relationships we have with 
technology companies today in at least two ways.  
First, data collectors are creating economic opportunities and dangers 
analogous to those caused by manufacturing. Danielle Citron has compared the 
advantages and risks posed by large databases of personal information to those 
created by the large reservoirs of water that powered the Industrial Age.128 These 
reservoirs powered textile mills, machines that churned out mass-produced 
convenience goods, and large new factories.129 But when the dams holding back the 
water broke, the escaping water caused significant, wide-spread property damage, 
unlike any that has been seen before the Industrial Age.130 A strict liability regime, 
exemplified by Rylands v. Fletcher,131 emerged to address the new problem of 
massive harm without fault. A similar story is playing out today. Companies like 
Facebook, Google, and Amazon are gathering terabytes of data on internet users. 
That data helps them and their partners identify new commercial opportunities.132 
It can connect job seekers and employers.133 It can help us find romance.134 It can 
 
125. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1512 n.1 (1992).  
126. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977).  
127. See Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700, 1708–24 
(2003) (discussing the history of the development of products liability for design defects). 
128. See Citron, supra note 25, at 244. 
129. See NORMAN SMITH, A HISTORY OF DAMS 169–80 (cited in Citron, supra note 25, at 281). 
130. Citron, supra note 25, at 243–44. 
131. Rylands v. Fletcher [1868] 3 LRE & I. App. 330 (HL). 
132. Retailers and marketers use large data sets on consumer behavior to target individuals and 
groups of internet users with advertisements that are ostensibly tailored to user interests. See, e.g.,  
Press Release, Network Adver. Initiative, Study Finds Behaviorally-Targeted Ads More than  
Twice as Valuable, Twice as Effective as Non-Targeted Online Ads (Mar. 24, 2010) (quoting  
Howard Beales, former Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection), available at 
https://www.networkadvertising.org/sites/default/files/imce/nai_beales_release.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/S5E6-359R]. 
133. See, e.g., Arnie Fertig, 4 Ways to Use Big Data in Your Job Hunt, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 4, 2014 




134. See We Use Math to Find You Dates, OKCUPID, https://www.okcupid.com/about 
[https://perma.cc/DA75-Y7JW] ( last visited June 16, 2019). 
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unlock our phones,135 turn on appliances in our homes,136 and play our favorite 
songs.137 But when the barriers protecting that information break, whether from 
within (unauthorized access) or without (hacking), the escaping information can 
cause untold damage to victims.138 The data can be used to discriminate,139 harass,140 
and cause intangible141 and pecuniary harm.142 Given the similarity between these 
two types of “reservoirs of danger,” Citron called for strict liability regimes to 
address harms associated with leaking databases of personal data.143 
Second, technological innovations have created significant power and 
information imbalances between technology companies and their users. Before 
industrialization, consumers often knew the people from whom they bought 
finished goods. Economic exchange was a far smaller, more intimate affair than it 
is today. As such, consumers could protect themselves from poorly made goods: 
they could see products before purchase, judge the trustworthiness of sellers, and 
exercise their power by buying goods from another seller.144 After industrialization, 
manufacturers knew what methods they used to create everything from glass 
bottles145 to children’s toys146 and heavy machinery,147 but consumers possessed 
neither the know-how nor the opportunity to investigate themselves, leaving them 
entirely at the mercy of producers.148 Users of digital technologies have even less 
power. Not only is our personal information collected and analyzed in a “black box” 
of proprietary algorithms and intelligent machines,149 but the designs of technology 
 
135. See About Face ID Advanced Technology, APPLE, https://support.apple.com/en-us/
HT208108 [https://perma.cc/76MA-D2VU] ( last visited June 16, 2019). 
136. But see Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, The Internet of Heirlooms and Disposable Things, 
17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 581 (2016) (noting that in the rush to connect objects to the internet, connected 
is not always better). 
137. See Mikey Campbell, Apple Reveals Algorithm Behind Apple Music Mixes, Execs Discuss 
Past and Future of Service, APPLEINSIDER (Sept. 26, 2016 5:33 PM), https://appleinsider.com/
articles/16/09/26/apple-reveals-algorithm-behind-apple-music-mixes-execs-discuss-past-and-future-
of-service [https://perma.cc/U7ZF-2GEC]. 
138. Citron, supra note 25, at 244–45. 
139. See, e.g., Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://
www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc 
/F6JT-VKY8]. 
140. See Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 345 (2014). 
141. See Solove & Citron, supra note 15. 
142. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, INFORMATION COMPROMISE AND THE RISK OF IDENTITY 
THEFT: GUIDANCE FOR YOUR BUSINESS (2004), https://dwtprivsec.lexblogplatformtwo.com/files/
2014/04/bus59-information-compromise-and-risk-id-theft-guidance-your-business.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/YYD4-JA69]. 
143. See generally Citron, supra note 25. 
144. See Sachs, supra note 25, at 231–33. 
145. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 436 (exploding bottle). 
146. See, e.g., Bailey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 431 P.2d 108 (Ariz. 1967) (pogo sticks). 
147. See, e.g., Soule v. Gen. Motors Co., 882 P.2d 298 (Cal. 1994) (car). 
148. See Sachs, supra note 25, at 219–23; see also Mauch v. Mfr. Sales & Service, Inc., 345 N.W. 
2d 338, 345 (S.D. 1984). 
149. See PASQAULE, supra note 44. 
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products and platforms today tilt the power balance toward the designers and away 
from users.150 Therefore, much like consumers of mass-produced goods, 
consumers of digital products that commodify their data cannot act as successful 
stewards of their own data safety. 
As a result of these similarities, it should come as no surprise that a variety of 
scholars have called for applying strict or products liability to privacy and data 
breach harms. William Prosser laid the groundwork for this scholarship when he 
published the now-definitive guides for privacy tort law151 and strict liability in the 
same year.152 Both articles have had an outsized impact on the law153 and because 
Prosser also served as the reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Torts, both 
privacy and strict liability were incorporated at the same time.154 Benjamin Sachs 
called for holding data collectors strictly liable for failure to keep our information 
secure.155 Sarah Ludington proposed a new strict liability tort, the tort of misuse of 
stored personal data, that would explicitly enforces the FIPPs.156 And Citron’s 
“reservoirs” metaphor argued for applying the strict liability model of Rylands v. 
Fletcher to data breaches.157 
B. Products Liability and Design 
Though insightful, each of these proposals aim to create liability for privacy 
harms through strict tort liability litigation. Sachs refers specifically to corporate 
data breaches, identity theft, and discrimination.158 Ludington’s new tort is situated 
as a solution to data leaks.159 And Citron applies Rylands to database operators 
because they are the ones aware of the “vulnerabilities in their computer networks” 
that could lead to harm ex post.160 My goal is to put meat on the bones of a privacy 
by design statute, not create a new tort. Moreover, these proposals focus on the role 
 
150. See HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 62–67; see also NOR. CONSUMER COUNCIL, DECEIVED BY 
DESIGN: HOW TECH COMPANIES USE DARK PATTERNS TO DISCOURAGE US FROM EXERCISING 
OUR RIGHTS TO PRIVACY ( June 27, 2018), available at https://fil.forbrukerradet.no/wp-content/
uploads/2018/06/2018-06-27-deceived-by-design-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/C58N-3BRD]. 
151. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960) (reviewing privacy case law from 
1890 and identifying four privacy torts). 
152. See William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 
YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) (discussing the rise of strict liability over the previous years). 
153. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (citing Prosser’s Strict 
Liability when adopting a rule of strict liability for defective products that cause injury to consumers); 
see also Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 
96 GEO. L.J. 123, 148–56 (2007) (discussing the impact of Prosser, as well as Warren and Brandeis, on 
the current state of civil privacy law). 
154. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A–652I (1977) (privacy torts); id. at §§ 
388–408 (products liability). 
155. See Sachs, supra note 25, at 240. 
156. See Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data Traders: A Tort for the Misuse of Personal 
Information, 66 MD. L. REV. 140, 171–72 (2006). 
157. See Citron, supra note 25, at 244. 
158. See Sachs, supra note 25, at 219–23. 
159. See Ludington, supra note 156, at 141. 
160. Citron, supra note 25, at 284. 
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of strict liability; products liability today has a far more diverse toolkit. This 
literature, then, only fights half the battle. 
Products liability influences design along two axes: directness and specificity 
(Table 1). Real or threatened litigation affects design indirectly and generally: it raises 
the ultimate costs of unsafe products to incentivize the development of safer 
ones.161 Incentive realignment is at least one of the justifications behind products 
liability generally162 and the proposal to apply strict liability in data breach and 
privacy cases.163 But because the deterrence factor only increases costs of bad 













Decisions in products liability cases can influence design directly and 
specifically by defining precisely what designs are safe and unsafe in given 
circumstances for given products. For example, after Chrysler was held liable for 
 
161. See, e.g., Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d 1425, 1429 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding manufacturer 
liability encourages the production of safe products); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 
539, 548 (N.J. 1982) (noting that “[b]y imposing on manufacturers the costs of failure to discover 
hazards, we create an incentive for them to invest more actively in safety research”); Daly  
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1169 (Cal. 1978) (reasoning that strict liability gives manufacturers 
an “incentive to produce safe products, . . . to avoid and correct product defects . . . [, and an] incentive 
toward safety both in design and production”); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
LAW 166 (3d ed. 1986) (arguing that costs of products liability litigation encourage companies to design 
safer products to bring prices in line with competitors); WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, 
THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 25–26 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that a “manufacturer who is made liable to 
the consumer for defects in a product will do what can be done to see that there are no such defects”). 
162. See, e.g., LaRosa v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. Rptr. 224, 233 (App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1981) 
(acknowledging that a company “will pass the costs of injuries along to the consumer in the form of 
increased prices for more dangerous products and that the consumer will be more likely to buy safer 
goods because they will be relatively less expensive”); see also Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of 
Enterprise Liability and Common Law Strict Liability, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1285, 1320 (2001); Robert  
L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Ideology of Enterprise Liability, 55 MD. L. REV. 1190, 1194 n. 22 (1996). 
163. See, e.g., Citron, supra note 25, at 265–67. 
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injuries to a policeman from an impact to the side of his car, automobile 
manufacturers knew that they had to design cars to withstand side impact 
collisions.164 And after Garrett v. Ford,165 which involved injuries from a lap seat 
belt, the auto industry started including three-point rear seatbelts in their designs.166 
In this way, court decisions concluding that particular designs were unsafe helped 
automakers redesign their cars in specific ways to comply.167 This aspect of 
products liability law, however, has its limits. Identifying precise safe or unsafe 
designs may provide certainty to designers in particular industries or in given 
circumstances. But it is impractical to expect courts to make all design decisions; 
judges and juries are neither institutionally competent nor close enough to the 
factors that go into design to do more than make specific decisions on the margins. 
Relatedly, products liability law can influence design specifically, but indirectly. 
For example, products liability decisions that hold companies liable for 
insufficiently testing potentially dangerous substances, like the silicone in breast 
implants,168 could influence any chemical company or drug manufacturer that must 
test products before putting them on the market. However, this indirect pathway 
for influencing the design process remains hypothetical and too disconnected from 
design to answer specific questions about privacy’s design law. 
This Article is focused on the fourth way products liability can influence design 
ex ante—namely, directly, yet generally. Over time, products liability litigation has 
developed a series of requirements and corporate behavioral norms that define what 
manufacturers have to do even before they get hooked into a tort lawsuit. By 
analogy, those norms and requirements offer us a new paradigm for what a privacy 
by design statute should require. This includes how companies can weigh the 
privacy risks against consumer benefits of new products and how to interpret the 
meaning of vague terms in the law long before either the threat of litigation or court-
mandated designs. To be clear, I am not proposing a products liability tort for 
privacy by design. Rather, I am taking a snapshot of products liability norms and 
rules and suggesting that this snapshot can flesh out what a privacy by design statute 
 
164. Dawson v. Chrysler, 630 F.2d 950, 958–59 (3d Cir. 1980). 
165. Garrett v. Ford, 684 F. Supp. 407 (D. Md. 1987) 
166. Id. at 411 (holding that compliance with federal regulations regarding seat belts does not 
pre-empt a different standard from being established through civil litigation); see also AM. ASS’N. FOR 
JUSTICE, DRIVEN TO SAFETY: HOW LITIGATION SPURRED AUTO SAFETY INNOVATIONS 5 (2010). 
167. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.”). The FTC was 
given the authority to prevent such practices in subsection (a)(2). See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2). This direct 
and specific effect of litigation is similar to how FTC consent decrees help technology companies 
determine what strategies, designs, and data use practices are “unfair or deceptive” under the FTC Act. 
See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114  
COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014) (arguing that the body of law created by FTC consent decrees amounts to 
a common law body of jurisprudence). “Those involved with helping businesses comply with privacy 
law . . .  parse and analyze the FTC’s settlement agreements, reports, and activities . . . .” Id. at 585–6.  
168. See, e.g., Dow Chemical v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98, 118–19 (Nev. 1998) (discussing, among 
other things, the fact that insufficient testing the safety of silicone in breast implants can be used as 
evidence in a products liability suit). 
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should require in practice. After all, doctrinal analogies are common throughout the 
law and particularly in privacy,169 where vague case law and statutes are constantly 
being referenced to answer new questions posed by new technologies. In the 
manufacturing context, products liability helped redesign dangerous products 
before. It can do so again for today’s data-hungry technologies. 
 
C. Applying the Products Liability Analogy 
Products liability for design defects can answer privacy by design’s open 
questions—Who is responsible for design? When does design take place? What 
does design law require? What are its goals and purposes? And how can users pursue 
their rights under the law?—and, thereby, transform privacy by design into privacy’s 
design law. 
1. Who? 
Privacy by design asks data collectors and upstream technology developers to 
include privacy considerations during the course of the design process.170 Though 
doing so makes some intuitive sense, this allocation of responsibility is subject to an 
epistemic attack based on STS and sociology scholarship that reminds us that design 
is not limited to heroic engineers or the corporations that hire them.171 Products 
liability had to respond to this same problem. It, too, had to allocate responsibility 
to someone. But it also acknowledged that users influence design when they modify 
products after purchase and when they use them in ways designers did not expect. 
Rather than giving up entirely, the common law adapted to the fact that design is a 
multifaceted social process by retaining manufacturer liability where consumer 
modifications and uses were reasonably foreseeable. Privacy’s design law can learn 
from these doctrines to place the onus of privacy design on technology companies. 
In the products liability context, manufacturers must do more than design 
reasonably safe products. They must design them so they can withstand both 
intended uses and those uses that, though unintended or unimagined by the 
designer, are reasonably foreseeable.172 In Barker v. Lull Engineering,173 for example, 
 
169. There are really too many to list. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 380 F.3d 1013 (7th  
Cir. 2004) (analogizing the inevitable discovery doctrine in Fourth Amendment law to the concurrent 
causation doctrine to answer a Fourth Amendment question about whether a second illegal search could 
cure the defects of a first illegal search); see also Sharon K. Sandeen, Relative Privacy: What Privacy 
Advocates Can Learn from Trade Secret Law, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 667, 670 (2006) (suggesting an 
analogy from privacy to trade secret law to address the problem of “relative privacy”); Jonathan Zittrain, 
What the Publisher Can Teach the Patient: Intellectual Property and Privacy in an Era of Trusted Privication, 
52 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1241–45 (2000) (analogizing privacy to intellectual property, generally, as both 
doctrines concerned with control over information). 
170. See supra Part I.A.1. 
171. See supra Part I.A.2. 
172. See, e.g., Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 577 (N.Y. 1975). 
173. Barker v. Lull Engineering, 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978). 
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a high-lift loader that was designed without outriggers overturned while working on 
a slope, injuring the lift’s operator.174 One of the manufacturer’s responses to the 
plaintiff’s products liability claim was that the lift was never meant to operate on a 
slope.175 The trial judge took this to heart, instructing the jury that they could only 
find the manufacturer liable if its product was being used in the intended manner.176 
The California Supreme Court rejected this, noting that the proper instruction had 
to include uses in “reasonably foreseeable manner[s].”177 It was reasonably 
foreseeable that a lift would sometimes be used on ground that was not perfectly 
flat. Similarly, in Katz v. Swift & Company,178 a butcher was injured when a rubber 
band securing lamb shanks snapped off.179 The court found that it was reasonably 
foreseeable that the bands would cause injury if not properly secured.180  
In both these cases, it was immaterial that the defendants claimed they did not 
anticipate the particular use or misuse of their products. It “was sufficient that it 
was foreseeable that injury might result” from uses that were reasonable, even if 
unintended.181 Otherwise, if designer intent delimited liability, then car 
manufacturers would be immune from lawsuits when their cars crashed and chair 
manufacturers would not have to design chairs strong enough for people to stand 
on; cars are meant to be driven, not crashed, and chairs are meant for sitting, not 
standing. Foreseeability became the linchpin of manufacturer liability, thus 
reflecting the reality of user involvement in the design process and the social 
construction of cultural artifacts. 
In most jurisdictions,182 moreover, manufacturer liability withstands not just 
unintended uses but subsequent modifications. Thompson v. Package Machine 
Company183 and Soler v. Castmaster184 are prime examples. In Thompson, the plaintiff 
lost her arm while reaching inside a plastic molding machine to remove a finished 
piece. She alleged several design defects, particularly to the safety mechanisms that 
were supposed to keep the machine open so a completed segment of plastic could 
 
174. Id. at 447. 
175. Id. at 448. 
176. Id. at 449. 
177. Id. at 452, 455–56. 
178. Katz v. Swift & Co., 276 F.2d 905 (1960). 
179. Id. at 905. 
180. Id. at 906 (the “defendant knew or should have known that if the rubber band were not 
securely attached it might slip off and cause injury”). 
181. Id. 
182. New York, among a few others, is an exception. In Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Division, 403 
N.E.2d 440 (N.Y. 1980), the New York Court of Appeals, the state’s highest court, held that a 
manufacturer of a product will not be held liable for a user’s injuries where “after the product leaves 
the possession and control of the manufacturer, there is a subsequent modification which substantially 
alters the product and is the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.” Robinson v. Reed-Prentice 
Division, 403 N.E.2d 440, 441 (N.Y. 1980). The majority of jurisdictions follow California’s and New 
Jersey’s rule on manufacturer liability even with subsequent consumer modifications. See infra nn. 184–
90 and accompanying text. 
183. Thompson v. Package Machine Co., 99 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1971). 
184. Soler v. Castmaster, 484 A.2d 1225 (N.J. 1984). 
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be removed and replaced.185  The company argued that only a modification to the 
machine after it had left the factory could have caused the safety latches to 
malfunction.186 The court declined to hold that a manufacturer could be immune 
from liability as a matter of law simply because of a “reasonably foreseeable” 
modification.187  
The New Jersey Supreme Court came to a similar holding in Soler. There, the 
safety gate on a die-casting machine malfunctioned, injuring the plaintiff’s hands 
when he tried to remove a finished product from the mold.188 Notably, though, the 
machine was not originally designed with a safety mechanism; the plaintiff’s 
employer had added one that would automatically shut off the machine’s power 
when the gate was open, thus allowing workers to reach in.189 The court declined to 
exonerate the machine’s manufacturer, despite the modification.190 Adding safety 
elements was foreseeable, the court said, especially since safety mechanisms were 
available on the market when the defendant built the machine.191 
Though they may not have recognized it at the time, the Barker, Katz, 
Thompson, and Soler courts were wrestling with the social aspects of design and 
technology. Each case shows that users do not just use; they also influence design. 
By deploying machines in ways their designers did not expect—much like when 
farmers used the first cars as stationary power sources192 or how rural women used 
their first telephones as agents of social connection193—the plaintiffs in Barker and 
Katz changed the design. In Thompson and Soler, consumers made physical 
modifications to machines, much like women had for years made a variety of 
adjustments to household and cooking appliances, all of which were created by men, 
when the designs did not suit their needs.194 Against this backdrop, most 
jurisdictions retained manufacturer liability despite user influence over design where 
uses and modifications were foreseeable. This puts the onus on manufacturers not 
just to design reasonably safe products (chairs that can be sat on), but also to 
consider the myriad ways in which their products can be used and how those 
products and uses fit into the broader ecosystem of social practice (chairs on which 
one can stand to reach a high shelf). 
This provides a convenient analogy to define the who of privacy’s law of 
design. Most jurisdictions retain manufacturer liability for defective products 
despite user impact on design. Not doing so would let manufacturers escape 
responsibility too often and, therefore, undermine the goals of products liability 
 
185. Thompson, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 283. 
186. Id.  
187. Id. at 286. 
188. Soler, 484 A.2d. at 1227. 
189. Id. at 1228. 
190. Id. at 1233. 
191. Id.  
192. See Kline & Pinch, supra note 61, at 768–94. 
193. See MARTIN, supra note 61. 
194. See Cowan, supra note 70. 
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generally.195 But in a nod to the social nature of design, courts limit that 
responsibility to designing for foreseeable uses. An analogous rule can be applied to 
a privacy by design statute: technology companies are responsible for privacy by 
design, and their duties to consider privacy from the ground up extends to the 
privacy implications of all the foreseeable uses of their products. In Part II.C.3, I 
discuss what that means in detail.  
2. When? 
But before detailing the what of design law, we have to determine the when of 
design. Given that design is an ongoing process that can continue well after product 
release, during what time span do corporate design law responsibilities exist? 
Products liability law generally requires manufacturers to design products that are 
reasonably safe from the moment of sale or distribution.196 This is mostly because 
harm to consumers starts at sale.197 But manufacturer duties extend well beyond 
that. Indeed, the products liability analogy suggests that privacy by design duties 
should exist throughout the lifecycle of data collection tools, from conception 
through use.198 
Products liability scholars have long debated the point in time at which courts 
should judge the safety of products.199 John Wade listed six possibilities: at the time 
of manufacture, distribution, purchase, injury, trial, or at no time in particular.200 
Both Restatements seemed to have settled on the time of distribution or sale. The 
 
195. See, e.g., John Jay Fossett, The Development of Negligence in Computer Law, 14  
N. KY. L. REV. 289, 306 (1987) (“Four policies are generally recognized as supporting the imposition 
of strict products liability. First, the party in the best position to detect and eliminate defects should be 
responsible for damages inflicted by defective products. Second, liability should be placed upon the 
party best able to absorb and spread the risk or cost of injuries through insurance. Third, a remedy 
should not be prevented by burdensome requirements of proof, since an injured person is not normally 
in a position to identify the cause of the defect. Fourth, due to modern marketing methods, consumers 
today rely on the reputation of a manufacturer and no longer accept the doctrine of caveat emptor.”). 
196. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1)(b) (1977); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998); see Chown v. USM Corp., 297 N.W.2d 218, 221 
(Iowa 1980) (holding that a plaintiff has to show that the design was unsafe as of time product 
manufactured). 
197. One of the goals of products liability is to reduce and ameliorate the harm faced by 
consumers. See, e.g., Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, Enterprise Liability and the Economic Analysis 
of Tort Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 835, 847 (1996); see also CALABRESI, supra note 42, at 24–94; Donald  
G. Gifford, The Peculiar Challenges Posed by Latent Diseases Resulting from Mass Products, 64  
MD. L. REV. 613, 627 (2005) (discussing Calabresi’s view that tort law can protect consumers from 
harm).  
198. Notably, this is how Article 25 conceptualizes the when of privacy by design. Article 25(1) 
states, in relevant part, that “the controller shall, both at the time of the determination of the means for 
processing and at the time of the processing itself, implement appropriate technical and organisational 
measures . . . .” Regulation 2016/679, supra note 1, art. 25, at 48 (emphasis added).  
199. John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to 
Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734, 739 (1983) (a defect “is not defined relative to a particular point in 
time”). 
200. Id. at 753–54. 
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Second Restatement focuses liability on a product that is “expected to and does 
reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it 
is sold,”201 implying that manufacturers are responsible for ensuring safety before 
their products leave the warehouse. The Third Restatement limits defects to those 
found “at the time of sale or distribution.”202 This suggests that designer and 
manufacturer responsibilities end at product release.203 
But these Restatement provisions do not tell the whole story. It is axiomatic 
that manufacturers retain certain duties to consumers after sale.204 Manufacturers 
have a duty to warn consumers of latent defects when the manufacturer discovers 
them.205 The rationale for this ongoing duty is that products with latent defects 
already on the market pose significant risks to consumers, and products liability law 
is meant, in part, to reduce danger to unsuspecting users.206 At the same time, 
however, manufacturers are rarely required to update their old products and retrofit 
those on the market to accommodate the latest and best safety technologies.207 
Doing so would be too onerous, administratively difficult, and prohibitively 
 
201. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1)(b) (1977).  
202. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998). 
203. See Michael B. Gallub, Limiting the Manufacturer’s Duty for Subsequent Product  
Alteration: Toward a Rational Approach, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 361, 363 (1988). 
204. See, e.g., John S. Allee, Post-Sale Obligations of Product Manufacturers, 12 FORDHAM  
URB. L.J. 625 (1984) (discussing and collecting cases on post-sale duty-to-warn contexts); Victor 
Schwartz, The Post Sale Duty to Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks in the Road to a Reasonable Doctrine, 58 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 892 (1983) (similar). 
205. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 202  at § 10; see 
also Bly v. Otis Elevator, 713 F.2d 1040, 1046 (4th Cir. 1983) (“the duty to warn is continuous and is 
not interrupted by manufacture or sale of the product.”); Comstock  
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 99 N.W.2d 627, 634 (Mich. 1959) (there exists “duty to give prompt warning 
exists when a latent defect which makes the product hazardous to life becomes known to the 
manufacturer shortly after the product has been put into the market”). 
206. See, e.g., Alden D. Holford, The Limits of Strict Liability for Product Design and Manufacture, 
52 TEX. L. REV. 81, 81–82 (1973) (explaining that one of the goals of products liability law is to protect 
consumers from dangerous materials on the market). 
207. See, e.g., Habecker v. Copperloy Corp., 893 F.2d 49, 54 (3d Cir. 1990) (no Pennsylvania 
case has ever required a duty to retrofit); Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1964)  
(a manufacturer is under a continuing duty to improve the safety of its products, even those already on 
the market); Gregory v. Cincinnati, Inc., 538 N.W.2d 325, 336–37 n. 42 (Mich. 1995) (rejecting the idea 
that manufacturers had a duty to update and retrofit products based on newly available safety 
technology because of the burden that would entail); Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d 
1299, 1308–09 (Kan. 1993) (post-sale retrofitting duties would create perverse incentives for 
manufacturers). When feasible in and certain limited circumstances, however, manufacturers have been 
required to remedy the danger. See, e.g., Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtis-Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451, 453 
(2d Cir. 1969) (“It is clear that after such a product has been sold and dangerous defects in design have 
come to the manufacturer’s attention, the manufacturer has a duty to either remedy these or, if complete 
remedy is not feasible, at least to give users adequate warnings and instructions concerning methods 
for minimizing the danger.”); Bell Helicopter v. Bradshaw, 594 S.W.2d 519, 532 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) 
(manufacturer post-sale duties required the company to “mandate replacement” of dangerous 
helicopter blade system, or to strongly suggest replacement in a notice “reasonably calculated to impress 
upon users the gravity of the risk, that such replacement be made.”). 
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expensive.208 And most jurisdictions hold that manufacturers are immune from 
post-sale liability when they sell so-called “naked” products, or dangerous 
machinery that will not work upon sale unless the consumer installs whatever safety 
equipment she chooses, on the theory that the original manufacturer is selling an 
inoperative and, thus, not dangerous, product.209 
These rules yield several lessons for the when of privacy by design. 
Manufacturer duties do not end at product release. Just like latent defects in 
manufactured products justify ongoing duties, privacy gaps in data collection code 
that pose continual risks to user data should give rise to ongoing duties as well.210 
In fact, this principle is already embodied in privacy law: data breach notification 
statutes require notifying consumers without unreasonable delay if personal data 
has been compromised211 and the FTC requires user notifications when privacy 
policies change.212 Moreover, whereas products liability generally declines to impose 
significant retrofitting duties on manufacturers because of cost and administrability, 
those barriers do not exist in the data collection context because most technology 
products are “tethered.”213 Tethered products, as defined by Chris Hoofnagle, 
Aniket Kesari, and Aaron Perzanowski, are those that are persistently linked to the 
seller, in this case, over wifi.214 Regular updates to code over an internet connection 
are relatively inexpensive and easy to administer compared to the cost of rebuilding 
heavy machinery that is physically beyond the control of the manufacturer. 
Therefore, the products liability analogy would both obligate technology companies 
to design for privacy through the moment of sale and beyond, and include ongoing 
duties to update platforms to better protect privacy going forward. 
3. What? 
Privacy by design requires technology companies to consider privacy from the 
ground up, making it endemic to their corporate culture and the products they 
create. But commentators have never been clear about what that means in 
practice.215 The products liability paradigm can help to specify the requirement. 
Since the California Supreme Court unanimously adopted a strict liability standard 
 
208. See Schwartz, supra note 204, at 898 (arguing that courts do not impose a post-sale duty to 
retrofit, in part, because of the expense); see also, e.g., Cincinnati Inc., 538 N.W.2d at 336–37 n. 42 
(declining to impose a duty to retrofit products with latest technology because of the burden on 
manufacturers). 
209. See, e.g., Bautista v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 504 N.E.2d 772, 774 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). 
210. See infra Part II.C.3 (discussing standards for governing those notices). 
211. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82 (West 2017). 
212. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 167, at 616 (discussing how the FTC requires companies 
to notify consumers of wrongdoing and about updates to data use practices). 
213. Chris Hoofnagle, Aniket Kesari & Aaron Perzanowski, The Tethered Economy, 87  
GEO. WASH. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=3318712 [https://perma.cc/5SY9-2QY6]. 
214. Id. at 1. 
215. See supra Part I.B.1. 
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in products liability cases in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,216 design defects law 
has evolved to include a panoply of specific tests and doctrines that tease out 
manufacturer responsibilities. Products liability today is not the same as it was in 
Greenman. But four elements—the risk/utility doctrine, foreseeable unintended 
uses, the reasonable alternative design (RAD) test, and the duty to warn—can, when 
taken together, describe the specific elements that go into manufacturers’ proactive 
obligations to design safe products. I argue that the same rules can clarify technology 
companies’ duties under privacy’s design law as well. 
a.  Balancing Test During Design 
The California Supreme Court introduced the risk/utility test in Barker v. Lull 
Engineering217 as one of two ways consumers could prove a manufacturer had 
designed a defective or unsafe product. Barker involved a high lift loader that 
overturned when it was used on a slope instead of flat ground.218 The court said 
either a plaintiff could demonstrate that a product failed to perform “as an ordinary 
consumer would expect”219—the consumer expectations test—or a jury could 
determine that “the risk of danger inherent in the challenged design outweigh[ed] 
the benefits of such design”220—the risk/utility test. Later, the court clarified when 
to use each test.221 A consumer expectations test is appropriate when common 
“everyday experience” is enough to understand how a product is supposed to 
work,222 as when farmers are injured by defective tractors,223 or when hospital 
workers get sick from unsafe latex gloves,224 or when weightlifters are hurt by leg 
press machines they use regularly.225 For more “complex” products like cars, a risk-
utility test, informed by expert testimony, makes more sense.226 
These tests normally operate inside adversarial litigation to determine ex post 
if a manufacturer violated its duty to consumers. But they can also have a direct 
effect on the design process.227 Where applicable, a consumer expectations test 
encourages manufacturers to conform the design of everyday products to ordinary 
 
216. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). 
217. Barker v. Lull Eng’g, 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978). 
218. Id. at 443. 
219. Id. at 454. 
220. Id. at 455. 
221. See Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298 (Cal. 1994). Notably, the Restatement (Third) 
of Torts: Products Liability does not include the consumer expectations test for design defect cases. 
Scholars disagree about whether this accurately reflects the state of the law or merely models the 
conservative policy preferences of the Reporters. For scholarly debate on the merits of changes brought 
on by the Third Restatement, see the literature cited in nn. 238, 253. 
222. Soule, 882 P.2d at 308, 310. 
223. See Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 945–46 (Kan. 2000). 
224. See Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 751 (Wis. 2001). The plaintiff 
used forty latex gloves per shift. Id. at 732. 
225. See Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., Inc., 784 A.2d 1178, 1182 (N.H. 2001). 
226. Soule, 882 P.2d at 309; see also, e.g., Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1333 
(Conn. 1997). 
227. See infra notes 5–169 and accompanying text; see also Tbl. 1. 
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uses and user expectations. The complexity of data collection tools, however, makes 
that impossible in the privacy context.228 A risk-utility test, however, encourages 
companies to weigh safety dangers against the benefits of the product during the 
design phase before product release. Notably, this is precisely the goal of privacy by 
design. 
Indeed, as scholars have noted, the problem identified by privacy by design is 
that privacy is getting short shrift before technology products are released,229 forcing 
privacy law to focus, rather ineffectively,230 on punishments after the fact.231 If 
privacy could be considered during design, it could compete against pernicious 
motives232 and the contrary incentives of corporate actors.233 This may require a 
heavy lift at some companies, including creating an active privacy team integrated 
into the design process234 and sufficiently powerful to make its voice heard within 
the corporate dynamic.235 It would require a group of privacy lawyers inside the 
design process to spot privacy issues as they come up.236 And it would require 
documenting the ways in which privacy is considered during design and how the 
product that emerges does not put privacy at unnecessary risk relative to its benefits. 
Understood through the analogy of the risk-utility test, then, privacy by design’s 
expectation that companies will consider privacy from the ground up can be 
 
228. See, e.g., PASQUALE, supra note 44, at 3, 28–31; Pauline Kim, Data Driven Discrimination at 
Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 889 (2017) (“[T]he quality or characteristic the model seeks to 
maximize (the target variable) may be clearly specified, but the algorithm is so complex that it is not 
possible to explain which factors drive the model’s predictions.”); W. Nicholson Price II, Big Data, 
Patents, and the Future of Medicine, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1401, 1404 (2016) (describing black box 
algorithms as “‘black-box’ precisely because the relationships at [their] heart are opaque—not because 
their developers deliberately hide them, but because . . . they are too complex to understand”); Michael 
L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth Amendment, 164  
U. PA. L. REV. 871, 886 (2016) (noting that algorithms can be so complex that the programmers do not 
even understand how they work). 
229. See HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 5 (noting the extraordinary incentives to design technologies 
to enhance data collection rather than restrict it); Waldman, Designing Without Privacy, supra note 91, at 
685–89 (discussing how some engineers at technology companies simply fail to consider privacy during 
design because of other pressing demands, the ambiguous nature of privacy, and a lack of corporate 
attention). 
230. See, e.g., Solove & Citron, supra note 15, at 747–56 (discussing how courts have generally 
declined to recognized data breach harms); Strahilevitz, supra note 169, 939–46 (discussing the lack of 
clear rationales in decisions “limited privacy” cases, with many results failing to protect privacy). 
231. See Richards & Hartzog, supra note 104, at 436. 
232. See, e.g., Lily Hay Newman, Uber Didn’t Track Users Who Deleted the App, but It Still 
Broke the Rules, WIRED (Apr. 24, 2017 6:58 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/04/uber-didnt-track-
users-deleted-app-still-broke-rules/ [  https://perma.cc/T9YC-A4E5]. 
233. See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995 (2014) 
(arguing that technology companies have primary incentives to collect more information about 
consumers in order to compete with their competitors); Rubinstein, supra note 88, at 1431–44 
(discussing the role of market incentives in corporate decisions to adopt privacy-enhancing 
technologies). 
234. See Waldman, Designing Without Privacy, supra note 91, at 711–25 (arguing for corporate 
organizational changes to better integrate privacy into the design process). 
235. See BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, supra note 90. 
236. See Waldman, Designing Without Privacy, supra note 91, at 714–15. 
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translated into design law as a requirement to perform a balancing of privacy harms 
against consumer benefit during the design phase of new products.237  
b. Foreseeable Uses 
Although there is considerable scholarly disagreement on whether it should 
be part of the law of products liability,238 foreseeability was included in the Third 
Restatement. It defines a defective product as one where the “foreseeable risks of 
harm” could have been avoided by a safer design.239 Foreseeability is also part of 
the doctrine of unintended uses, as discussed above.240 The foreseeability doctrine 
offers another helpful analogy for privacy’s law of design. When conducting risk-
utility balancing, technology companies should consider the privacy implications of 
all foreseeable uses of a product.241 
Data-based technologies have been used in many ways their designers might 
not have intended. For example, Facebook claims it was designed to bring people 
together,242 not to spread fake news243 or manipulate user behavior.244 Live-
streaming technology may have been designed to help reach a vast audience at low 
cost, but it has also been used to broadcast sexual assault245 and mass shooting.246 
And location-based tracking may facilitate a host of modern conveniences, but it 
 
237. See HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 127–28. 
238. Although I use foreseeability here, I am not arguing that liability for defective products 
should be based on a foreseeability standard. Rather, the goal of this Article is to describe ex ante 
obligations for privacy by design. Liability is not an issue. For arguments against including foreseeability 
in products liability, please see, e.g., John B. Attanasio, The Principle of Aggregate Autonomy and the 
Calabresian Approach to Products Liability, 74 VA. L. REV. 677 (1988); Stephen P. Croley & Jon  
D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683 
(1993); Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle That Safety Matters More 
Than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114 (2001); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First Party Insurance 
Externality: An Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129 (1990); Keating, 
supra note 162; Kysar, supra note 127, at 1790; Stephen F. Williams, Second Best: The Soft Underbelly of 
Deterrence Theory in Tort, 106 HARV. L. REV. 932 (1993). 
239. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (1998). 
240. See supra Part II.C.1. 
241. See, e.g., Gallub, supra note 203, at 404 n. 2424 (noting that “foreseeability of product’s uses 
establishes the parameters of its manufacturer’s responsibility”). 
242. See, e.g., Josh Constine, Facebook Changes Its Mission Statement to ‘Bring the World Closer 
Together,’ TECHCRUNCH ( June 22, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/22/bring-the-world-
closer-together/ [https://perma.cc/7KD8-XYC8]. 
243. See, e.g., Siobhan Hughes, Mark Zuckerberg: Facebook Made Mistakes on ‘Fake News,’ 
Privacy, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 9, 2018 2:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mark-zuckerberg-
facebook-made-mistakes-on-fake-news-privacy-1523289089 [https://perma.cc/92P8-BMDG]. 
244. See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, Facebook Manipulated 689,003 Users’ Emotions for Science, FORBES 
( June 28, 2014 2:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/06/28/facebook-
manipulated-689003-users-emotions-for-science/#3df42df7197c [https://perma.cc/KV8T-TA3Y]. 
245. See, e.g., Brittney McNamara, Girl Who Live Streamed Rape on Periscope Sentenced to Prison, TEEN 
VOGUE (Feb 15, 2017 6:40 PM), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/girl-live-streamed-rape-on-
periscope-sentenced-prison [https://perma.cc/X9RT-S8D2]. 
246. See Kate Klonick, Inside the Team at Facebook That Dealt with the Christchurch Shooting, 
NEW YORKER (Apr. 25, 2019 12:16 PM), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/inside-the-
team-at-facebook-that-dealt-with-the-christchurch-shooting [https://perma.cc/JD7V-MM4S]. 
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has also been a tool of intimate partner harassment and invasions of privacy.247 
Admittedly, only some of these uses are arguably foreseeable. And reasonable 
people can disagree; foreseeability in tort law is usually a question of fact for a jury 
anyway.248 But in the ex-ante design context, foreseeability would be a fact-based 
conversation among technology product designers, privacy professionals, users, 
professional associations, journalists, and independent and academic experts, each 
of whom may bring unique perspectives on foreseeable uses. At a minimum, using 
the design phase to consider at least the foreseeable potential dangers of privacy-
compromising technologies can make technology products safer.  
For example, the genetic testing company 23andMe recently formed a 
partnership with the pharmaceutical giant, GlaxoSmithKline, to use 23andMe’s 
storehouse of DNA data to develop new drugs.249 This eventuality was arguably 
foreseeable from the moment 23andMe’s saliva-based home DNA tests were 
designed. The company included the possibility in its privacy policy.250 But the 
partnership with Glaxo raises several privacy concerns, including the risks in 
transferring personal data, the potential dangers for blood relatives who never 
consented to use of their DNA, and the likelihood that 23andMe customers may 
not have understood the implications of their consent. Considering these questions 
before product release could have led to several design modifications to the product 
that could pre-empt problems after the fact. Granted, consent to participate in 
research was designed as an opt-in, rather than opt-out. But the company could 
have gone further by making the opt-in far clearer, including explaining exactly how 
the consumer’s DNA data will be used,251 and more noticeable, whether through an 
on-screen pop-up during registration or a brightly-colored insert in the package 
itself. Designers could have also created anonymization and security tools with 
future partnerships in mind. Executives could have also minimized the amount of 
 
247. See, e.g., DIANA FREED ET AL., “A STALKER’S PARADISE”: HOW INTIMATE PARTNER 
ABUSERS EXPLOIT TECHNOLOGY (Apr. 2018), http://www.nixdell.com/papers/stalkers-paradise-
intimate.pdf [perma.cc/RW9L-MJMW]. 
248. See, e.g., Merriweather v. E.W. Bliss Co., 636 F.2d 42, 45 (3d Cir. 1980) (same); Wingett  
v. Teledyne Indus., 479 N.E.2d 51, 56 (Ind. 1985) (holding that the question of foreseeability is properly 
for a jury); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 847–48 (N.H. 1978) (same). 
249. See Maggie Fox, Drug Giant Glaxo Teams up with DNA Testing Company 23andMe, NBC 
NEWS ( July 25, 2018 2:00 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/drug-giant-glaxo-
teams-dna-testing-company-23andme-n894531 [https://perma.cc/LC2Z-2TZ9]. 
250. See Privacy Highlights, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/about/privacy/ 
[https://perma.cc/KL5W-ES95] ( last visited June 16, 2019) (“If you choose to consent to participate 
in 23andMe Research, 23andMe researchers can include your de-identified Genetic Information and 
Self-Reported Information in a large pool of customer data for analyses aimed at making scientific 
discoveries.”). 
251. Compare id. (referring only to “use of your data for scientific research purposes”), Frequently 
Asked Questions, “Privacy,” ALL US RES. PROGRAM https://www.joinallofus.org/en/faq [https:// 
perma.cc/EL5V-UMHA] ( last visited June 16, 2019) (explaining precisely when, how, and why 
personal information may be used). 
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data they would share with pharmaceutical companies.252 These steps cannot 
guarantee safety from privacy or data breaches, but they can pinpoint inflexion 
points and ameliorate the risk. 
c. A Reasonable Alternative Privacy-Protective Design 
That said, merely requiring companies to engage in a balancing test of 
foreseeable benefits and harms is still rather vague. A third products liability 
analogy—the reasonably alternative design, or RAD, test—can specify what 
technology companies should be balancing. The rich literature on RAD is 
voluminous, including whether it reflects the state of the common law253 or 
undermines the entire project of strict liability for defective products.254 Those 
debates are for another time. For our purposes, a RAD is, on its face, easy to 
understand: if a safer way of designing a product with available technology255 would 
have reduced the foreseeable risk of harm256 without undue cost, the manufacturer 
should have chosen that design instead of the more dangerous one. Or, put another 
way, a safer design’s costs (including manufacturing costs and reduced product 
functionality, among others) must be less than the costs of foreseeable injuries 
prevented by incurring the costs of the safer design.257  
Wherever one stands on the role of RAD in design defect litigation, the 
concept can serve as a convenient analogy for privacy’s design law. Like RAD, 
where a manufacturer has to weigh the costs of safer designs against the foreseeable 
injuries, privacy by design requires a technology company to weigh the costs of 
more privacy-protective design—including privacy defaults, opting in to data 
collection, just-in-time notifications, enhanced consents, data minimization, 
 
252. This principle is embodied in the GDPR. See Regulation 2016/679, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(c), 
at 35 (data minimization). 
253. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective 
Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867 (1998) (justifying the conclusion that RAD had been adopted 
by many jurisdiction through analysis of case law); Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of  
Torts: Products Liability Section 2(B): The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61  
TENN. L. REV. 1407, 1408–13 (1994) (reviewing cases challenging the conclusion that RAD was 
supported by the majority of jurisdictions at the time). This debate is beyond the scope of this Article. 
This Article takes no position on whether demonstrating a RAD should be part of a products liability 
claim. Rather, it is based on the presumption that RAD is at least part of the law of products liability 
for design defects today, something even critics have come to accept. See Vandall, supra 1413–20 (noting 
that some jurisdictions include RAD as either one factor to consider in risk-utility balancing and that 
other jurisdictions require defendants to prove that there was no RAD). 
254. See, e.g., Ellen Wertheimer, The Biter Bit: Unknowable Dangers, the Third Restatement, and 
the Reinstatement of Liability Without Fault, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 891 (2005) (seeing RAD as reneging 
on the promise of strict liability in products liability). 
255. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 reps. n. cmt. d(IV)(B) 
(1998). The Restatement uses the phrase “state of the art” and notes that the phrase “has been variously 
defined by a multitude of courts. For some it refers to industry custom or industry practice; for others 
it means the safest existing technology that has been adopted for use; for others it means cutting-edge 
technology.”  
256. Id. at § 2 cmt. f.  
257. See id. at cmts. d, f. 
Final to Printer_Waldman (Do Not Delete) 7/22/2019  7:56 PM 
2019] PRIVACY’S LAW OF DESIGN 1277 
restrictions on processing, limitations on collections and storage, and so forth—
against foreseeable privacy risks and any loss in program utility or function. If a 
safer, more privacy-enhancing option exists without undue sacrifices in function, 
privacy’s design law would require companies to choose the safer option.258  
The Third Restatement places the burden of proving a RAD on a plaintiff 
during litigation.259 But that is a minority view; only a few states have abandoned 
the Second Restatement for the Third in this regard.260 In Barker v. Lull 
Engineering,261 for example, the California Supreme Court concluded that when 
consumers had everyday experience with the products at issue, design defects 
should be determined on a consumer expectations test. But when the product was 
too complex for ordinary comprehension, risk-utility balancing made more sense.262 
As several courts have already concluded,263 the burden of demonstrating that no 
other RAD exists is the manufacturer’s responsibility.264 In the context of privacy’s 
law of design, the very complexity of algorithmic platforms265 and technology 
companies’ continued insistence on maintaining the secrecy of their data collection 
tools also suggests that they should shoulder the burden of demonstrating that a 
RAD did not exist when they built and sold their products. 
To support this more directed balancing test, companies can learn from 
privacy impact assessments (PIAs) at government administrative agencies. PIAs are 
analyses of how personal information is collected, used, shared, and maintained.266 
Their purpose is to ensure that designers, executives, privacy professionals, and 
other relevant employees have consciously incorporated privacy protections 
throughout the lifecycle of a product. More specifically, PIAs identify and evaluate 
privacy risks, consider alternatives, identify strategies to mitigate risks, and help 
 
258. See also HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 128. 
259. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS  LIABILITY § 2(b) (1998).  
260. See Vandall, supra note 253, at 1408–13. 
261. Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978). 
262.  See, e.g., id. at 455–56 (the risk-utility test “places the burden on the manufacturer, rather 
than the plaintiff, to establish that because of the complexity of, and trade-offs implicit in, the design 
process, an injury-producing product should nevertheless not be found defective.”); see supra notes 218–
27 and accompanying text.  
263. See, e.g., Onati v. Straub Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 659 P.2d 734 (Haw. 1983) (applying Barker); 
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979) (“We hold that the plaintiff need only show 
that he was injured and that the injury was proximately caused by the product’s design. The defendant 
may then avoid liability for a defectively designed product by proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that ‘on balance, the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in 
such design.’”).  
264. See Vandall, supra note 253, at 1408–13. 
265. See PASQUALE, supra note 45, at 140–42;  see also Frank Pasquale, Bittersweet Mysteries of 
Machine Learning (A Provocation), LONDON SCH. ECON. & POL. SCI.: MEDIA POL’Y PROJECT 
BLOG (Feb. 5, 2016), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2016/02/05/bittersweet-mysteries-
of-machine-learning-a-provocation/ [https://perma.cc/849V-Q8BS] (calling complex algorithms the 
“sweet mystery of machine learning”). 
266. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENTS,  https://www.ftc.gov/site-
information/privacy-policy/privacy-impact-assessments [https://perma.cc/LB7H-YAC4] ( last 
visited June 16, 2019).  
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articulate the rationale for the final product.267 Therefore, PIAs help technology 
products designers conduct their own version of a RAD analysis, ensuring that 
privacy-protective options get a fair shot during design. Although simply adopting 
a version of a PIA would be insufficient—a commitment to privacy has to be 
instantiated into the culture, as well268 and not merely a symbol of compliance269—
the protocol would force companies to make a record of their privacy 
considerations and foster transparency and accountability.270 
d. Privacy Notices and Design 
Alongside conducting a risk-benefit analysis and determining if a RAD exists, 
manufacturers also have duties to warn consumers of foreseeable dangers.271 
Technology companies that collect our data have similar duties to warn; indeed, 
informing users of a company’s data use practices is at the heart of the notice-and-
choice regime that governs much of consumer privacy law today.272 But, as I have 
argued elsewhere, neither data collectors nor regulators have paid much attention 
to the manner in which privacy notices are presented to users, despite the fact that 
design and aesthetics can be manipulative.273 An analogy to the duty to warn in 
products liability would establish notice as a design obligation and bring much 
needed corporate and regulatory attention to the design of privacy policies.  
There are two types of warnings in products liability law. At the point of sale, 
manufacturers are required to warn customers of dangers associated with 
foreseeable uses of the product.274 If sometime after sale, manufacturers learn or 
should have learned that their products are dangerous, they have a duty to make a 
reasonable effort to issue a post-sale warning to consumers.275 And the general rule 
is that point-of-sale and post-sale warnings have to be “adequate,” or reasonable 
under the circumstances.276 Post-sale duties to warn are more limited than those at 
the time of sale. Warning customers at the time of sale is relatively easy: a 
manufacturer can place labels on products before they leave the warehouse.277 After 
 
267. See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking in 
Administrative Agencies, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 76 (2008). 
268. Id. at 78. 
269. See EDELMAN, supra note 18 (discussing how merely symbolic structures have replaced 
substantive progress as evidence of compliance with civil rights laws).  
270. See A. Michael Froomkin, Regulating Mass Surveillance as Privacy Pollution: Learning from 
Environmental Impact Statements, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1752 (2015) (recommending the adopting of 
Privacy Impact Notices (PINs), combining transparency and accountability in good privacy design). 
271. See, e.g., Richter v. Limax Int’l, Inc., 45 F.3d 1464, 1471 (10th Cir. 1995) (manufacturers 
have a duty to warn of dangers “reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer of the product”). 
272. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 167, at 592 (noting how privacy policies are used to fulfill 
the “notice” part of “notice and choice”). 
273. See Waldman, Privacy, Notice, and Design, supra note 23. 
274. See, e.g., Melancon v. W. Auto Supply Co., 628 F.2d 395, 399 (5th Cir. 1980). 
275. See, e.g., Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 529 F. Supp. 539, 542 n.2 (D. Minn. 1982). 
276. See, e.g., Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 657 (1st Cir. 1981); Levin v. Walter 
Kidde & Co., 248 A.2d 151 (Md. 1968). 
277. See Lovick v. Wil-Rich, 588 N.W.2d 688, 693 (Iowa 1999). 
Final to Printer_Waldman (Do Not Delete) 7/22/2019  7:56 PM 
2019] PRIVACY’S LAW OF DESIGN 1279 
sale, after a product leaves the control of the manufacturer, practical barriers make 
post-sale warnings far more expensive and difficult.278 
In certain cases, courts have gone further, describing what adequate notices 
should look like. Warnings need to be “clear and specific,” and clear and 
unequivocal warnings on the product itself or in the owner’s manual have 
sufficed.279 Notices that are too long can undermine their effectiveness. As the 
Fourth Circuit has stated, “Well-meaning attempts to warn of every possible 
accident lead over time to voluminous yet impenetrable labels—too prolix to read 
and too technical to understand.”280 Several courts have also held that warnings 
cannot be simple lists of risks; rather, they must convey information in a format and 
using language that gets a consumer’s attention and conveys the seriousness of the 
risks involved.281 Notice adequacy in products liability law is, therefore, a matter of 
“display, syntax and emphasis.”282 Warnings must also be attuned to a consumer’s 
level of knowledge, or reflect a foreseeable consumer’s lack of experience or  
skill operating the product.283  
Privacy notices can learn from this jurisprudence. The two types of notices in 
privacy map neatly on manufacturers’ warnings. First, privacy policies, which 
developed first as industry’s way to stave off regulation284 and spread further under 
state and federal mandates,285 are akin to point-of-sale warnings. Privacy policies 
 
278. See id. at 694; see also Schwartz, supra note 204, at 895–96.  
279. See Hood v. Ryobi Am. Corp., 181 F.3d 608, 611 (4th Cir. 1999). 
280. Id.  
281. See Brochu, 643 F.2d at 657. A product warning “may be inadequate in factual content, in 
expression of the facts, or in the method by which it is conveyed.” Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 666  
F. Supp. 1483, 1498 (D. Kan. 1987).  
282. See D’Arienzo v. Clairol, Inc., 310 A.2d 106, 112 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1973) (adequacy “depends 
upon the language used and the impression that it is calculated to make upon the mind of an average 
user of the product” and involves “[q]uestions of display, syntax and emphasis”). 
283. See Todalen v. U.S. Chem. Co., 424 N.W.2d 73, 80 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (when developing 
product warnings, manufacturers have to consider inexperience or lack of skill of a foreseeable class of 
consumers). It is worth noting that many, but certainly not all, of the cases to describe this more detailed 
standard for adequacy involve drugs or chemicals. See, e.g., Brochu, 643 F.2d at 653 (oral contraceptives); 
Wyeth Labs., 666 F. Supp. at 1498 (vaccines); D’Arienzo, 310 A.2d at 226 (hair dye). The Restatement 
(Third) of Torts immunizes prescription drug manufacturers from design defect liability, see James  
A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Drug Designs Are Different, 111 YALE L.J. 151 (2001), 
suggesting there may be a trend to treat drug manufacturers differently than other manufacturers. But 
see George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 109 
YALE L.J. 1087 (2000). But, the standard is also used in other types of product liability cases. See, 
e.g., Dalton v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., 703 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1983) (car); Stapleton v. Kawasaki Heavy 
Indus., Ltd., 608 F.2d 571, 572 (5th Cir. 1979), opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 612 F.2d 905 (5th  
Cir. 1980) (motorcycle). 
284. Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control over Personal 
Information?, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 587, 593 (2007) (“Online privacy policies have appeared . . . as 
voluntary measures by websites . . . .”); see also Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm 
Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2041, 2047 (2000) (noting that an FTC threat for greater regulation 
resulted in a substantial increase in the number of websites offering privacy policies);  Solove & Hartzog, 
supra note 167, at 593–94. 
285. See Waldman, Privacy, Notice, and Design, supra note 23, at 90–95 (showing how state and 
federal statutes require privacy policies). 
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warn us of all the ways in which our data will be collected, used, and shared. They 
are, however, confusing.286 No one reads them.287 They are long288 and difficult to 
understand.289 And they are designed and presented to us in ways that make them 
manipulative of our behavior.290 Second, so-called “just-in-time” notices, roughly 
like post-sale warnings, are presented to us not when we first buy a Google Phone 
or visit a website, but at the moment just before data collection occurs while using 
a platform, product, or app, allowing us to navigate our disclosure behavior more 
effectively.291 Just-in-time notices have been endorsed by the FTC and 
recommended as a best practice in the mobile privacy ecosystem.292 But just-in-time 
notifications today are often take-it-or-leave-it and far more about encouraging 
users to just click “yes” and move on than consider their disclosure behavior.293 
Privacy policies and just-in-time notifications today are ineffective because 
they are inadequately designed. In products liability, the design of warnings matters 
because courts recognize that presentation influences comprehension and only 
comprehensible notices can adequately protect consumers.294 The same should be 
true of privacy notices. Under this analogy, “a clear, concise warning of potential” 
privacy concerns would be required.295 It could be supplemented by a longer privacy 
policy intended for regulators, but technology companies and regulators should 
design and present privacy notices with an eye toward ordinary user comprehension, 
 
286. Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Policies: Mismatches Between Meaning and 
Users’ Understanding, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 39, 40, 87 (2015) (“[A]mbiguous wording in typical 
privacy policies undermines the ability of privacy policies to effectively convey notice of data practices 
to the general public.”).  
287. See, e.g., George R. Milne & Mary J. Culnan, Strategies for Reducing Online Privacy  
Risks: Why Consumers Read (or Don’t Read) Online Privacy Notices, 18 J. INTERACTIVE MARKETING 
15, 24 (2004). 
288. George R. Milne, Mary J. Culnan & Henry Greene, A Longitudinal Assessment of Online 
Privacy Notice Readability, 25 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 238, 243 (2006). Lorrie Cranor estimates 
that it would take a user an average of 244 hours per year to read the privacy policy of every website 
she visited. See Lorrie Faith Cranor, Necessary but Not Sufficient: Standardized Mechanisms for Privacy 
Notice and Choice, 10 J. ON TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. L. 273, 274 (2012). This translates to about 54 
billion hours per year for every U.S. consumer to read all the privacy policies she encountered. See 
Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y 
FOR INFO. SOC’Y. 540, 563 (2008).  
289. See Mark A. Graber, Donna M. D’Alessandro & Jill Johnson-West, Reading Level of Privacy 
Policies on Internet Health Web Sites, 51 J. FAM. PRAC. 642, 642 (2002).  
290. See Waldman, Privacy, Notice, and Design, supra note 23. 
291. FED. TRADE COMM’N, MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES: BUILDING TRUST THROUGH 
TRANSPARENCY 15 (Feb. 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/ 
mobile-privacy-disclosures-building-trust-through-transparency-federal-trade-commission-staff-
report/130201mobileprivacyreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZSJ6-AGPV].   
292. See id. at 1. 
293. See HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 23–67; see also Norwegian Consumer Council, supra note 
141. Consider, for example, the take-it-or-leave-it approach of cookie notifications, which are often 
presented as acknowledgements with “ok” or “dismiss” buttons rather than with options to “accept” 
or “decline” cookies. 
294. See D’Arienzo v. Clairol, Inc., 310 A.2d 106, 112 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1973); Brochu v. Ortho 
Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 657 (1st Cir. 1981).  
295. D’Arienzo, 310 A.2d at 112. 
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using simple statements, user-friendly aesthetics, and colors and tables,296 while 
making them accessible to users through pop-ups and even more “visceral” forms 
of notice that ensure understanding.297 Moreover, because technology companies 
face none of the practical burdens manufacturers used to face when trying to reach 
consumers post-sale, just-in-time notifications should follow the same rules.  
4. Why? 
The next building block of privacy’s design law is identifying its underlying 
values. This is an important task, as it helps make sense of confusing statutory 
language298 and helps regulated entities craft effective compliance strategies. But, as 
discussed above, the various definitions of privacy by design reflect a variety of 
different values, including control, trust, and obscurity, among others.299 Indeed, it 
is hard to imagine privacy values not embraced by some definition of privacy by 
design. A products liability paradigm offers a different perspective: fairness. 
Fairness was at the heart of Justice Traynor’s concurrence in Escola v. Coca 
Cola Bottling,300 where he laid out the policy arguments justifying strict liability for 
defective products. Whereas manufacturers can anticipate some of the dangers in 
their own products, consumers of mass produced goods cannot.301 Whereas 
manufacturers are well situated to bear the costs of preventing injury through new 
designs, consumers are generally unprepared to handle the overwhelming cost of 
injury to life and limb.302 And whereas manufacturers are the ones placing 
dangerous goods on the markets, consumers are the ones getting injured.303 As the 
torts scholar Gregory Keating put it, as between the party benefiting from 
production and the party that “happen[s] to be victims,” those that cause harm as a 
result of their profit-making activities should be responsible, and not only because 
they can more easily absorb and distribute the loss.304 It is, rather, a matter of simple 
fairness.305 As a weapon of fairness, products liability law aims to reset the 
imbalance between producers and consumers, holding manufacturers’ responsible 
for the harm they cause. 
 
296. See Waldman, Privacy, Notice, and Design, supra note 23, at 117–24. 
297. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME  
L. REV. 1027, 1034–44 (2012). 
298. See, e.g., KARL LLWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 268–77 
(1960); Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 
667 (1958) (arguing that rather than trying to discern the meaning of specific words, the task of 
interpretation is to look at the statute and make it a “coherent, workable whole”). 
299. See supra Part I.B.2. 
300. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling, 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944). 
301. Id. at 440–41 (Traynor, J., concurring). 
302. Id. 
303. Id. 
304. Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of Cost-Justification, 56  
VAND. L. REV. 653, 667 (2003) (calling this rationale “enterprise liability”). 
305. Gregory C. Keating, Rawlsian Fairness and Regime Choice in the Law of Accidents, 72 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1857 (2004). 
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The wide social, informational, and resource asymmetry between technology 
companies and their users mirrors the power imbalance between manufacturers and 
consumers described by Justice Traynor in Escola, thus requiring a similar rebalance 
through a fairness lens. Technology companies know (or should know) about the 
privacy risks their products create, but because those data collection tools are “black 
box” proprietary algorithms, ordinary consumers are ill-equipped to protect 
themselves.306 Technology companies are some of the most dynamic, nimble, and 
richest businesses operating today,307 which makes them far more capable than 
ordinary consumers to address privacy dangers. Users can only try to deal with the 
enormous costs after something goes wrong. Fairness dictates that technology 
companies should shoulder the responsibility of designing products that better 
protect users from privacy dangers that users cannot protect against themselves. 
Fairness also recognizes the undeniable connection between privacy and 
equality.308 Traditionally marginalized social groups require data privacy in ways 
entrenched majorities often fail to recognize. As Mary Anne Franks has explained, 
“[a]ttentiveness to race, class, and gender is vital to understanding the true scope of 
the surveillance threat. Marginalized populations, especially those who experience 
the intersection of multiple forms of subordination, also often find themselves at 
the intersection of multiple forms of surveillance: high-tech and low-tech, virtual 
and physical.”309 And those forms of surveillance can be designed into new 
technologies. For example, surveillance apps, geosocial tracking, and other tools are 
becoming common weapons in intimate partner violence.310 A fairness-in-design 
approach puts the onus on the designing company to consider how design will not 
just affect the ordinary consumer, but also marginalized consumers, many of whom 
have even less of an opportunity to protect themselves from privacy harms.311 
 
306. See PASQUALE, supra note 44, at 3, 28–31, 34–36, 78–79. 
307. Apple recently became the first American company worth $1 trillion. See Mark Gurman, 




Moreover, on July 26, 2017, Facebook reported $9.3 billion in revenue for the second quarter of that 
year, up 45 percent from the same period in 2016. Profits rose to $3.9 billion, up 91 percent from  
the previous year. See Mike Isaac, Facebook’s Profit and Revenue Surge, Despite Company 
Predictions of a Slowdown, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/26/
technology/facebook-users-profit.html [https://perma.cc/62LT-RW7J]. 
308. See, e.g., JUDITH W. DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND THE RISE OF 
TECHNOLOGY (1997) (“Protection of privacy enhances and ensures the freedom from such scrutiny, 
pressure to conform, and exploitation.”). 
309. Mary Anne Franks, Democratic Surveillance, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 425, 464 (2017). 
310. See, e.g., Rahul Chatterjee et al., The Spyware Used in Intimate Partner Violence, IPV TECH 
RES. (2018), https://www.ipvtechresearch.org/pubs/spyware.pdf [http://web.archive.org/web/2019 
0510222447/https://www.ipvtechresearch.org/pubs/spyware.pdf ] (presented at the 2018 IEEE 
Symposium on Security and Privacy). 
311. This is especially true when predictive algorithms reflect data and human biases. See, e.g., 
Julia Angwin et al., supra note 139. 
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5. How? 
Privacy’s law of design must also provide sufficient notice to users, allowing 
them to both distinguish compliance from malfeasance and practically enforce their 
right to a design process that considers their privacy from Day 1. Unfortunately, 
pathways to vindicating design rights have rarely been part of the privacy by design 
literature. Scholars either ignore it and focus on corporate ex ante obligations312 or 
deputize regulators like the FTC, European DPAs, and state attorneys general as 
privacy enforcers.313 Undoubtedly, regulators should be (and are) empowered to 
force technology companies to follow privacy’s law of design. And, as Woodrow 
Hartzog has argued, the FTC is well-situated to consider manipulative and abusive 
design as part of its mandate to police “unfair and deceptive” business practices.314 
But saddling consumer safety regulators with the entire burden of enforcing 
privacy’s law of design is risky. Both the FTC and European DPAs are overworked 
and lack the budgets and institutional capacities to address bad corporate behavior 
on their own.315 Users must be able to validate their own design rights through a 
private right of action built into a privacy by design statute. Products liability offers 
several insightful lessons to make that a reality. 
Privacy plaintiffs have struggled to prove particularized harm because courts 
have routinely found their claims of injury—risk of future harm, preventative 
measures to guard against identity theft, and anxiety about data security316—too 
speculative.317 In so doing, judges are requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate harms as 
 
312. Ann Cavoukian’s PbD, for example, makes no mention of privacy by design as a consumer 
right capable of validation through the courts. See CAVOUKIAN, supra note 9. 
313. See, e.g., HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 138–42 (describing how the FTC has already litigated 
cases involving deceptive design tactics). 
314. Id.; see also Woodrow Hartzog, Unfair and Deceptive Robots, 74 MD. L. REV. 785 (2015) 
(arguing that the FTC has the capacity to regulate the deceptive designs of robots). 
315. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 169, at 600 (stating that the FTC averages 10 enforcement 
actions per year); see also EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, DATA 
PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE ROLE OF NATIONAL DATA PROTECTION 
AUTHORITIES 42 (2010), available at http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/815-Data-
protection_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/JS52-NE4R] (“In many Member States, DPAs are not in a 
position to carry out the entirety of their tasks because of the limited economic and human resources 
available to them. This is the case in Austria, Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Latvia, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Slovakia.”); Julia Powles & Enrique Chaparro, How Google Determined Our 
Right to Be Forgotten, GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2015, 2:30 EST), http://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2015/feb/18/the-right-be-forgotten-google-search [https://perma.cc/NU7B-UADQ] 
(“Most of Europe’s 31 national data protection authorities are cumbersome, under-resourced 
bureaucracies issuing occasional, random fines and reacting when a court occasionally clarifies the 
law.”). 
316. For a taxonomy of alleged data breach harms and an insightful discussion of how courts 
have conceptualized those harms, see Solove & Citron, supra note 5, at 749–54. “The overarching 
concern is that risk and anxiety are speculative, subjective and, worse, susceptible to manipulation by 
attorneys who desire to manufacture injuries out of a data breach.” Id. at 774. 
317. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) (plaintiffs failed to show that 
ongoing government surveillance affected their work in any way); Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 
40, 43 (3d Cir. 2011) (increased risk of identity theft is too speculative); In re Jetblue Airways Corp. 
Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 326–27 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that “loss of privacy” is not a 
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if an invasion of privacy is no different than getting hit by a car, a fist, or falling 
debris. But the two injuries are quite different and in ways that the law has long 
understood. Privacy plaintiffs should not be crammed into a physical harm box; 
other types of harms are recognized at common law. The tort of assault, where the 
shibboleth of liability is fear, not physical or pecuniary harm, is more than 600 years 
old.318 Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) compensates for 
emotional harm as well.319 Daniel Solove and Danielle Citron have argued that an 
objectively reasonable person standard can determine the reasonable cost of 
ensuring against the intangible, though no less real, risks associated with data 
breaches, thus creating a cognizable injury.320 Failing to consider privacy during 
design creates technology products that put our privacy at risk.321 As Ryan Calo has 
argued, this kind of harm is analytically distinct from the category of harm 
cognizable in torts like assault and IIED.322 It also resembles the intangible harms 
Solove and Citron discussed in the data breach context.323 Therefore, assessing the 
reasonable costs of injury prevention could operate in design litigation as well.  
As a statute, privacy’s design law can impose statutory damages that obviate 
the need for any user to identify specific harm, much like the GDPR. Products 
liability justifies this. Products liability recognizes that in addition to a specific injury 
caused by a faulty product, defective designs on the market carry social costs: they 
can cause harm to many people at the same time, burden ordinary individuals with 
outrageous recovery costs,324 and allow predatory manufacturers to gain a 
competitive advantage by shortcutting safety.325 These social costs are one of the 
 
sufficiently concrete injury to survive a motion to dismiss). But see Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 663 
Fed. App’x 384, 388 (6th Cir. 2016) (recognizing that increased risk of identity theft and reasonably 
incurred mitigation costs to avoid future harm were sufficient for standing because hackers allegedly 
had stolen plaintiffs’ information and the defendant offered free credit monitoring services to help 
consumers mitigate danger). Recently, in Spokeo v. Robbins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016), the Supreme 
Court held that a plaintiff had to show “concrete” injury for Article III standing, but that “intangible 
harm” and “risk” could suffice if it bore a “close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been 
regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit.”  
318. I de S et Ux. v. W de S, Y.B. 22 Edw. 3, fol. 99, pl. 60 (1348). 
319. See Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 140–58 (1992) (discussing 
various examples included IIED). 
320. See Solove & Citron, supra note 15, at 774. 
321. HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 1–21 (discussing the pervasive role of design and its 
manipulative potential to take away our data). 
322. Ryan Calo, Privacy Harm Exceptionalism, 12 COLO. TECH. L.J. 361, 363 (2014). 
323. See generally Solove & Citron, supra note 15 (discussing how data breaches cause increased 
feelings of risk, anxiety, and emotional harm). 
324. See Ellen Wertheimer, Punitive Damages and Strict Products Liability: An Essay in 
Oxymoron, 39 VILL. L. REV. 505, 506 n.4 (1994) (“Design defects thus threaten equally all those who 
come into contact with the particular product, and therefore bring with them the potential for 
widespread injury and liability.”); see also CALABRESI, supra note 43, at 24, 70, 72 (arguing for shifting 
social costs of accidents from individual victims to those more capable of handling them). 
325. See Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort 
Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1, 86 (1992). 
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reasons why products liability permits punitive damages in some circumstances.326 
Therefore, significant statutory damages can be imposed to deter technology 
companies from evading their design responsibilities to society.  
6. Privacy’s Design Law Summary 
Tying these who, what, when, why, and how strands together gives us a vision 
of privacy’s law of design. Under this model, a privacy by design statute would 
require anyone who develops and markets products that collect and process user 
data327 to, when conceiving, designing, developing, and using those products,328 
balance the products’ benefits to consumers against their foreseeable privacy risks 
and only place in commerce those products that achieve reasonably similar 
consumer benefit with the least privacy risk.329 This duty includes the responsibility 
to inform users, throughout the lifecycle of products, of how the products collect 
and process data and of all foreseeable privacy risks in a manner that adequately and 
comprehensibly conveys those risks to an ordinary user.330 
This approach to privacy’s law of design has several advantages. First, it 
reflects both the social nature of design and the importance of fairly allocating 
responsibility for protecting personal privacy. Current privacy law, based on the 
myth of control and extracted consent,331 forces unprepared users to bear the 
burden of protecting their information in the face of manipulative design. As 
Woodrow Hartzog has written, even when platforms give control to users through 
various options, privacy centers, and click boxes, consent “can act to shift the 
burden of responsibility for protecting privacy to people who are less equipped to 
handle it . . . . Control . . . comes [with] a practical obligation” to exercise that 
control.332 When users do not, as primed by design,333 technology companies 
translate our “inaction as acquiescence.”334  This formulation of privacy by design 
is consciously meant to tip the balance back toward corporate responsibility for 
privacy. 
 
326.  See, e.g., Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828, 839 (3d Cir. 1983) (punitive damages 
may be awarded for “outrageous conduct”); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 227–28 (Colo. 
1984) (punitive damages intrauterine device case); Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 46–47 
(Alaska 1979) (allowing punitive damages where gun manufacturer knew of defective design yet still put 
the revolver in commerce), modified, 615 P.2d 204 (Alaska 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981); Rinker 
v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655, 668 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (stating that “there is no fundamental 
reason for excluding products liability cases from the cases in which punitive damages may be 
recovered”); see id. at 67–69.  
327. See supra Part II.C.1. 
328. See supra Part II.C.2. 
329. See supra Part II.C.3. 
330. See supra Part II.C.3.d. 
331. See HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 62–67.  
332. See Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy and the Dark Side of Control, IAI NEWS (Sept. 4, 2017), https:/
/iainews.iai.tv/articles/privacy-the-dark-side-of-control-auid-882 [https://perma.cc/J8DH-F5YQ]. 
333. See NOR. CONSUMER COUNCIL, supra note 293, at 12–39. 
334. See HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 66. 
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Second, this model of privacy’s design law is clear, yet flexible. It provides a 
governing structure and some level of certainty as to what the law requires without 
mandating specific designs. The only specific limit it places on designers is the 
requirement to choose a reasonably alternative privacy-protective design when one 
exists. Otherwise, design law guarantees that privacy will have a fair shake during 
design. And for judges and regulators seeking to interpret design law’s requirement, 
a products liability model gives them the tools to answer vanguard questions as they 
come up. It also gives users clear guideposts for pursuing their design rights through 
regulators like the FTC or directly through the courts. 
Third, despite its flexibility, it nevertheless places limits on predatory, 
opportunistic corporate behavior. Absent a requirement to consider privacy during 
design and to market only those products that achieve similar goals with privacy-
protecting tools, many dangerous technologies are making their way to unsuspecting 
consumers. For example, there is no reason why a smartphone flashlight app needs 
to collect terabytes of user data and share it with advertisers.335 Nor should an app 
track us after we delete it.336 Privacy’s design law would restrict this kind of 
deception.  
That said, some might object to this formulation of privacy’s law of design as 
arbitrary; that is, ask why products liability? Although it is true that other analogies 
besides products liability—consumer protection, for example337—could bring 
clarity to privacy by design, products liability for design defects makes the most 
sense. As I argued above, privacy by design and products liability developed in 
similar socioeconomic circumstances to address similar problems of design. They 
both focus on the way new technologies are built and how they affect real people. 
That other options exist does not detract from the validity of the products liability 
analogy. 
This proposal may also trouble those who feel that judges, juries, and 
regulators do not belong meddling in the design process. Indeed, if privacy’s law of 
design requires technology companies to demonstrate that products sold to users 
did not have a reasonable alternative privacy-protective design, the judgment of 
courts or regulators could supplant the judgment of designers themselves. Such 
concerns are overblown. Products liability for design defects has been around for 
decades, and overtime, judges have developed flexible standards for determining 
what is safe and reasonable. At no time have judges replaced designers. For example, 
courts decided that building a car with seatbelts capable of inflicting injury during 
an accident is unreasonably dangerous,338 but those judges never designed new 
seatbelts themselves. Rather, they set out boundaries, made value judgments, and 
 
335. See Robert McMillan, The Hidden Privacy Threat Of … Flashlight Apps?, WIRED (Oct. 20, 
2014 2:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/10/iphone-apps/ [https://perma.cc/ASQ9-YH 
XN]. 
336. See, e.g., Lily Hay Newman, supra note 232. 
337. See HARTZOG, supra note 4, at 123–26. 
338. See, e.g., Garrett v. Ford, 684 F. Supp. 407 (D. Md. 1987). 
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represented society’s interests in designing safe cars. That said, if privacy’s design 
law shines some light on the “black box” of technology design, that might be a good 
thing. Technology companies today reap enormous benefit from zealously guarding 
their algorithmic secrets. And yet, as Frank Pasquale has shown, opaque data 
collection tools have the potential to influence and manipulate human behavior.339 
They can discriminate,340 and cause substantial harm to real people.341 Technology 
companies are even using the opacity of their data products market technologies 
without taking responsibility if something goes wrong.342 Peering into the black box 
to ensure social justice concerns like safety and privacy are at least part of the design 
process is long overdue.343 
A third related objection is that this formulation of privacy’s design law would 
stifle technological innovation. Again, I disagree. Despite the prevalence of the 
argument that regulation stunts innovation, there is very little evidence in support.344 
Indeed, creativity and innovative thinking often thrive within constraint.345 And 
even if that were not the case, I am unwilling to surrender to the intellectual 
hegemony of innovation. Sometimes, there are other things that matter more, 
including fairness and protecting users from predatory, data-hungry design. 
CONCLUSION 
Privacy by design today is a lot of hype with very little substance. Although it 
has enormous potential to reset the power imbalance between data collectors and 
users, it suffers from too much ambiguity. It has yet to define its who, what, when, 
why, and how. And without that, it cannot transition from a buzzword to a legal 
mandate. 
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This Article set out to facilitate that transition by answering privacy by design’s 
open legal questions. It began by laying out those questions, and it relied on science 
and technology and sociology scholarship to identify the built-in complexities and 
assumptions of each. With this background, and drawing from the law of products 
liability for design defects, the Article then offered a new vision for what privacy by 
design should mean in practice. And that analogy makes sense. Both doctrines 
emerged in similar socioeconomic contexts to answer similar questions. Both share 
the similar goals of creating safer products and protecting consumers from harm. 
Both recognize that the best way to do that is to have an impact on ex ante design 
rather than to wait for something to go wrong. Both want to be sufficiently flexible 
to balance the need for regulation with breathing room for dynamic technological 
change.  
Privacy by design has been around for over a decade. But as it matures so must 
its scholarship. Privacy studies on design need to shift from ideas to substance if 
design law’s impact is going to match its potential. Future scholarship must apply 
this model of privacy’s law of design to specific questions as they come up. It must 
also be tested to determine if this, or any other, vision is being operationalized on 
the ground, at the technology companies designing the digital products we use every 
day and among data protection regulators and policymakers. This research can take 
the form of ethnographic interviews and controlled experimentation. Policymaking 
about privacy by design should not only consider the paradigm proposed in this 
Article, but it should focus on the purposes and goals privacy by design is meant to 
achieve. In this Article, I focused on protecting consumers, alleviating power 
imbalances, removing manipulative and privacy—invasive technologies from the 
market, and, above all—fairness. Privacy’s law of design, whatever form it takes, 
can be successful when it embraces these values. 
 
